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INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago, in the 1919 case of Abrams v. United States, Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes ushered into existence modern First Amend-
ment jurisprudence by introducing the “free trade in ideas” model of free
speech.1  According to this model, the ultimate good is reached by allowing
speakers to engage in the free trade in ideas—free of government interven-
tion in the way of regulation, censorship, or punishment.  Ideas must be
allowed to compete freely in an unregulated market, and the best ideas will
ultimately get accepted by competing with others in this marketplace.  As
such, government intervention is unnecessary and counterproductive.  Thus,
instead of punishing the speakers in Abrams—for criticizing the govern-
ment’s attempts to crush the Russian Revolution and calling for American
workers to strike2—the government should have taken a hands-off approach
and allowed these ideas to compete (and lose) in the marketplace of ideas.3
The characteristics of our marketplace(s) of ideas have changed dramat-
ically since 1919, when the Russian immigrants in Abrams threw their leaflets
from the fourth floor window of a hat factory in lower Manhattan in an effort
to widely disseminate their ideas.4  Russians are still players in our market-
place of ideas, but today’s marketplace suffers from uniquely modern and
challenging problems—such as rampant interference in the form of Russian
troll farms mass-producing tweets and other widely shared content on social
media with the intent and the effect of sabotaging U.S. elections.5  In addi-
1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 617–19 (majority opinion).
3 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 617–18 (majority opinion).
5 See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT 2017-01D, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 3 29-MAY-19 15:31
2019] the  marketplace  of  ideas  online 1521
tion to the widespread dissemination of false political content from both for-
eign and domestic sources, today’s online marketplace of ideas is besieged by
the increased polarization and siloing of thought and opinion, which renders
Holmes’s prescribed remedy for harmful speech—counterspeech—increas-
ingly ineffective.6
In the past two years we have seen a variety of efforts, both in the United
States and across the globe, by governments and by online platform providers
themselves, to address the problems, distortions, and imperfections in the
online marketplace.  Because online platforms like Facebook and Twitter
play such a dominant role in the online marketplace of ideas—and the mod-
ern marketplace of ideas generally—it is worthwhile to focus specifically on
how these platforms are being regulated, as well as how they are regulating
themselves.  While the United States has essentially taken a hands-off
approach to regulating online platforms, the European Union has assumed a
relatively aggressive regulatory approach.7  The European Union, as well as
several European countries, have generally implemented speech regulations
to hold platforms liable for failing to police their sites, and have recently
imposed sweeping regulations on such platforms.  And, in their efforts to
comply with such regulations, online platforms like Facebook and Twitter
may end up implementing these European regulations in ways that affect
what U.S. audiences can access online—since it is often difficult for platforms
to implement national regulations in a geographically targeted manner with
no spillover beyond the regulating nation’s borders.8  Accordingly, it is
worthwhile to examine these international efforts in some detail.  The Euro-
pean Union and European countries have recently undertaken sweeping
efforts to remedy perceived imperfections in the marketplace,9 including by
requiring online platforms to rapidly remove a wide swath of harmful con-
tent.10  Among European nations, Germany has led the way by enacting dras-
tic legislation requiring social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to
remove false news, defamatory hate speech, and other unlawful content
within twenty-four hours of receiving notice of the same, upon pain of multi-
IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 2 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01
.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Cristina Maza, Florida Shooting: Russian Bots Flooded the Internet with Propa-
ganda About Parkland Massacre, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/
florida-shooting-russian-bots-twitter-809000 (reporting on Russian-linked bots tweeting
about the Parkland shooting and gun reform).
7 See infra Section III.A (comparing Communications Decency Act section 230 and
the European Union approach to online intermediary liability).
8 See infra Section III.A.
9 See, e.g., Joanna Plucinska, Macron Proposes New Law Against Fake News, POLITICO (Jan.
3, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-proposes-new-law-against-fake-news
(reporting on French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal for “new rules cracking
down on fake news”).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 60–72.
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million-euro fines.11  Other European countries are considering following
suit.
In addition to government regulation by the European Union and by
European governments, the online platforms themselves are undertaking
self-regulatory measures with respect to content accessible by U.S. audiences
(partly in an effort to forestall U.S. government regulation).12  Although
such self-regulatory efforts are not governed by the First Amendment, they
are nonetheless inspired by First Amendment values.13  The leading social
media companies have adopted several measures to attempt to address
problems in the online marketplace of ideas, including by enabling the flag-
ging of false news for verification by independent third-party fact-checkers,14
commissioning the development of counterspeech in response to false news,
providing contextual information about purveyors of news-related posts, and
removing fake sites and purveyors of false news from their platforms.15
Although the United States has largely taken a hands-off approach to
regulating online platforms, in the wake of the severe problems besieging the
platforms in the context of the 2016 presidential election and thereafter,
U.S. legislators have recently sought to hold the online platforms responsible
for such problems.  In addition to extensive legislative hearings during which
legislators have sought to hold the companies to account for such
problems,16 legislators have recently proposed new laws to attempt to remedy
such problems.  In particular, Congress recently proposed the Honest Ads
11 See Overview of the NetzDG Network Enforcement Law, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.
(July 17, 2017), https://cdt.org/insight/overview-of-the-netzdg-network-enforcement-law.
12 See, e.g., Germany: Flawed Social Media Law: NetzDG Is Wrong Response to Online Abuse,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-
flawed-social-media-law [hereinafter Flawed Social Media Law](“At least three countries—
Russia, Singapore, and the Philippines—have directly cited the German law as a positive
example as they contemplate or propose legislation to remove ‘illegal’ content online.”).
13 As Marvin Ammori explains, those at the helm of such companies report that they
are inspired by and committed to First Amendment values in general and the marketplace
of ideas model in particular.  Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawy-
ering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2262 (2014).
14 See Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: How Is Facebook’s Fact-Checking Program Working?,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 14, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/hard-
questions-fact-checking (describing the steps taken in the fact-checking process, including
identifying potentially false stories, reviewing the story, and action taken against false sto-
ries); Sydney Schaedel, How to Flag Fake News on Facebook, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 6, 2017),
https://www.factcheck.org/2017/07/flag-fake-news-facebook.
15 See Sarah Frier, Facebook Has Removed More than 800 U.S. Accounts Spreading Fake News,
TIME (Oct. 11, 2018), http://time.com/5422546/facebook-removes-800-fake-news-
accounts/ (reporting that Facebook has “removed 559 pages and 251 accounts that were
coordinating the spread of misinformation and spam in the U.S.”); see also Sheera Frenkel,
Facebook to Remove Misinformation that Leads to Violence, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/facebook-to-remove-misinformation-that-
leads-to-violence.html (reporting that Facebook will remove content as misinformation if it
“could lead to people being physically harmed”).
16 See, e.g., Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-
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Act in an effort to limit foreign interference in the online marketplace of
ideas and to mandate the disclosure of information regarding the source of
political advertisements on social media.17
Finally, in the United States, victims and targets of some of the problems
besieging the online marketplace of ideas—including false news, conspiracy
theories, and hoaxes—are increasingly turning to defamation law in an effort
to hold the purveyors to account for the harms resulting from such online
content.18
This Article surveys the severe problems in today’s online marketplace of
ideas and the efforts that regulators—and the online platforms themselves—
have recently adopted in an attempt to address such problems.  In Part I, this
Article examines the historical foundations of the “marketplace of ideas”
model, as articulated in Holmes’s early opinions, as well as the Court’s even-
tual adoption of the marketplace model and, with it, the adoption of
counterspeech, instead of censorship, as the default response to harmful
speech.  Part II then examines the scope and extent of the problems besieg-
ing the modern online marketplace of ideas, focusing on problems that have
arisen especially in the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election and
thereafter on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter.  In Section
III.A, this Article examines the sweeping regulatory efforts recently adopted
by the European Union and by Germany in particular, and the ways in which
the online platforms are striving to implement such regulations.  In Sections
III.B and III.C, the Article turns to an analysis of the self-regulatory efforts
undertaken by leading social media platforms Facebook and Twitter, the
likely efficacy of such measures in addressing the problems besieging the
online marketplace of ideas, and the extent to which such measures are con-
sistent with First Amendment values.  In Section III.D, the Article examines
the constitutionality and the likely efficacy of the recently proposed Honest
Ads Act.  In Section III.E, the Article examines the extent to which the defa-
mation lawsuits brought by victims of false news, conspiracy theories, and
online hoaxes are consistent with the First Amendment.  A brief conclusion
follows.
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
The Supreme Court’s marketplace of ideas model of the First Amend-
ment has its roots in Holmes’s “free trade in ideas”19 formulation, which
zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/ (transcribing Senate hearing of Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg).
17 Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017).
18 E.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Alex Jones, Pursued over Infowars Falsehoods, Faces a Legal
Crossroads, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/
alex-jones-defamation-suit-sandy-hook.html.
19 Note that Holmes—in his judicial opinions and in his writings—did not use the
phrase “marketplace of ideas” and the Court itself did not adopt this formulation until
1953 with Justice William O. Douglas’s concurrence in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
56 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring). See Christoph Bezemek, The Epistemic Neutrality of the
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places primacy on the individual speech decisions of market actors unfet-
tered by government regulation, as articulated by Holmes in several dissent-
ing opinions in the early twentieth century.20  In his first significant First
Amendment opinion, Holmes dissented from a decision upholding the pros-
ecution of five individuals for encouraging resistance to the United States’
action in World War I.21  In Abrams v. United States,22 Holmes championed a
robust marketplace of ideas constituted by the free speech decisions of indi-
viduals like the Abrams defendants, free of state censorship:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitu-
tion.  It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . While that experi-
ment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to
be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate inter-
ference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.23
Influenced by his intellectual predecessors John Milton24 and John Stu-
art Mill,25 as well as by his contemporaries Judge Learned Hand, Harold
“Marketplace of Ideas”: Milton, Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes on Falsehood and Freedom of Speech, 14
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 159, 172–73 (2015); Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test of Truth: The
“Marketplace of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV. 383, 390 (2014).
20 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624.
22 Abrams involved the prosecution of five Russians for violating the Espionage Act for
encouraging resistance to the United States in the war against Germany in World War I.
Id. at 616–19 (majority opinion).
23 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Holmes adopts in this passage
a skeptical theory of ultimate truth—one in which ultimate “truth” cannot be known or
identified, but merely consists in whatever emerges as the winner in the competition in the
marketplace of ideas. Id.
24 John Milton, while primarily renowned as one of the greatest English poets, was also
an outspoken opponent of state censorship.  In response to a statute passed by the English
Parliament that prohibited publication of any book without government approval, Milton
argued forcefully in favor of freedom of expression against government censorship.  In this
representative passage from his Areopagitica, Milton poetically set forth the foundation for
the marketplace of ideas conception of freedom of expression, which Holmes later relied
on:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt
her strength.  Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter?
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (Richard C. Jebb ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1918) (1644).
25 John Stuart Mill carried forth Milton’s metaphor in his opposition to government
censorship and expressly adopted a free trade in ideas conception of the free speech
guarantee:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that is robbing
the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 7 29-MAY-19 15:31
2019] the  marketplace  of  ideas  online 1525
Laski, and Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,26 Holmes argued that the state
should not be permitted to interfere in the free trade of ideas by prohibiting
speech considered dangerous by the government, unless such interference
was necessary to avert an imminent danger that was likely to occur.27  Accord-
ing to this model, speech should be conceptualized in a manner analogous to
other market goods, upon which market forces should be allowed to operate
freely, absent an emergency.  Holmes believed that the First Amendment
meant that government intervention to hold in check what the government
believed were dangerous ideas was unconstitutional, and that the Abrams
defendants’ criticism of government actions should have been allowed to
compete with other ideas in the market and have their say, without the gov-
ernment intervening to censor or punish them.28
According to Holmes and his free speech ally Justice Louis Brandeis,29
the proper response to allegedly harmful speech is not censorship but
counterspeech.  Consistent with the marketplace of ideas theory, Holmes and
Brandeis believed that, absent a true emergency, the proper response to bad
speech is good speech.30  As Brandeis explained in his oft-quoted concur-
rence in Whitney v. California, joined by Holmes:
Those who won our independence believed that [within our system of free
expression] . . . discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . .  [The Founders knew that] repres-
sion breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and pro-
posed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. . . . If
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they
are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth, produced by its collision with error.
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 79 (J.M.
Dent & Sons 1922) (1861).
26 See, e.g., THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT (2013); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS
TIMES 198–211 (2004); Gerald Gunther, Essay, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975); David M. Rab-
ban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (1983).
27 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
28 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29 Although Holmes and Brandeis were united in their commitment to strong free
speech protections, they differed in their understanding of the philosophical foundations
for such protections.  Holmes, as discussed above, adopted a utilitarian conception,
emphasizing the importance of the free trade in ideas, while Brandeis focused in particular
on the importance of free speech for the deliberative democratic process. See, e.g., Vincent
Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v.
California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
30 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting).  As Holmes explained in his Abrams
dissent, “[o]nly the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correc-
tion of evil counsels to time warrants making an exception to the sweeping command,
‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.’” Id. at 630–31 (omis-
sion in original).
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there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies [of speech], to
avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.31
According to the marketplace theory, ideas should be allowed to com-
pete freely in the marketplace unfettered by government intervention, absent
emergency conditions.  The remedy for harmful ideas in this marketplace is
not censorship but counterspeech, which works by allowing those who are
exposed to bad speech to be exposed to good speech as a counterweight.
While the marketplace of ideas theory accords broad protection to good
and bad ideas, it does not accord the same broad protections to good and
bad assertions of fact.  Although the Supreme Court in embracing the mar-
ketplace of ideas theory has made clear that there is no such thing as a false
idea—and that all ideas are protected—it has also emphasized that false state-
ments of fact are not similarly immune from regulation.  While the Court has
sometimes recognized the minimal potential contributions to the market-
place of ideas made by harmless lies32 or false statements of fact,33 it has also
emphasized that the First Amendment does not stand in the way of regulat-
ing intentionally false, harmful assertions of fact.34  After New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, false statements of fact that are made with knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, and that harm
another’s reputation, are actionable.35
Holmes and Brandeis advanced the marketplace model of free speech at
a time when the marketplace for speech was radically different than today’s
marketplace, and when government intervention into economic markets
generally was rare.36  The prevailing marketplace for speech in their time
centered around speakers on soapboxes and printed works like newspapers,
journals, and leaflets like those tossed by the Abrams defendants from the
upper floor of buildings in an attempt to widely disseminate their ideas.37
31 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927), (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(emphasis added), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam).
32 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 732 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that when Alvarez posed as a military medal recipient, this was a seem-
ingly harmless lie, since this did not hurt anyone and was a lie that could be easily falsified
if a list of medal recipients were made available on the internet).
33 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitu-
tional value in false statements of fact.  Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on
public issues.” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270)).
35 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
36 See Robert Higgs, The Growth of Government in the United States, FOUND. FOR ECON.
EDUC. (Aug. 1, 1990), https://fee.org/articles/the-growth-of-government-in-the-united-
states (contrasting the government taxes in the early twentieth century, six to seven per-
cent of the gross national product, with 1950 taxes, twenty-four percent of the gross
national product).
37 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617–18 (1919).
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Such markets provide a sharp contrast to the online marketplaces for speech
characteristic of today, in which Russian troll farms create false online
accounts on Twitter and Facebook to widely disseminate false news stories at
a staggering level of magnitude to sabotage the democratic process in the
United States.38  Holmes himself downplayed the potential harms inherent
in the unregulated marketplace of ideas of the early twentieth century, char-
acterizing the speech at issue in Abrams, for example, as “silly leaflet[s]” dis-
seminated by “poor and puny anonymities,” with little chance of influencing
the populace or ultimately winning out in the marketplace.39  In contrast, as
Part II describes in greater detail, although the speech at issue today may be
advanced by “anonymities,” the speakers are not “puny” and the unregulated
marketplace of ideas in 2019 is anything but harmless.  As the harms embod-
ied in today’s marketplace of ideas become increasingly more severe, the
arguments for intervention to fix the flaws in this marketplace become more
compelling.
In addition, since 1919, government intervention to correct market fail-
ures in economic markets has become increasingly more frequent and
accepted.40  While government intervention in speech markets is and should
continue to be subject to far more searching scrutiny than intervention in
economic markets, modern First Amendment jurisprudence does not render
the government powerless to provide narrowly tailored remedies directed to
fixing the flaws in today’s marketplace of ideas.  Of course, our hands are not
as free as in other countries, which, like Germany, have the power to enact
regulations directed to addressing the flaws in the online marketplace of
ideas unfettered by the First Amendment’s constraints.  Yet, consistent with
the First Amendment’s dictates, the U.S. government enjoys certain limited
but powerful avenues for attempting to address these flaws.  Below, this Arti-
cle examines in greater detail the flaws in the online marketplace of ideas
and evaluates the efficacy and constitutionality of tools that the government,
online platforms, and affected individuals are wielding to attempt to remedy
such problems.
II. THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF TODAY’S ONLINE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Today’s online marketplace of ideas is fraught with unique problems.
First, as discussed above, in the online marketplace of ideas, individuals are
increasingly siloed in their own echo chambers to an unprecedented degree,
such that counterspeech may be of limited effect.41  Second, the online infor-
38 See, e.g., Maza, supra note 6.
39 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628–29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40 See, e.g., David Brodwin, Why We Need the Government in the Marketplace, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelli-
gence/2012/12/21/why-we-need-the-government-in-the-marketplace.
41 See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amend-
ment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 77 (2018) (describ-
ing the “essence of the filter bubble phenomenon” as “the intertwining of individual and
algorithmic content personalization on social media and other news aggregation platforms
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mation ecosystem is besieged by false news and intentional misinformation.42
In particular, a dire problem that today’s online marketplace of ideas faces is
the manipulation of speech forums like Facebook and Twitter by foreign
operatives in an attempt to interfere with our democratic processes, as
occurred in the context of large-scale Russian interference in the 2016 presi-
dential election and the 2018 midterm elections in the United States.43  Such
false and intentionally misleading information on the internet is particularly
problematic, given that the internet is a dominant (if not the dominant)
source of information in the political sphere, with two-thirds of Americans
identifying internet sources as their leading sources of information in con-
nection with the most recent U.S. presidential election.44
The influence of misinformation and foreign interference in our 2016
presidential election was exacerbated by the use of automation in the form of
bots, trolls, and fake accounts to amplify disinformation, manipulate public
discourse, exacerbate political and social divisions, and deceive voters on a
mass scale, especially via Twitter platforms, in a manner that was targeted to
members of the U.S. electorate, especially in swing states.45  Such automated
accounts have the ability to tweet messages out hundreds of times per day
and to drown out the voices of U.S. citizens.46  Russian bots, for example,
were responsible for a substantial percentage of election-related tweets
work[ing] to deflect news sources and content that do not correspond to the user’s estab-
lished content preferences and political orientation” (footnote omitted)).
42 See id. at 70 (comparing the cost of production between fake news and legitimate
news).
43 See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 5, at 1; Rebecca Ballhaus
& Dustin Volz, U.S. Intelligence Officials Warn of ‘Pervasive’ Russian Efforts to Disrupt 2018
Elections, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-intelligence-officials-warn-of-perva-
sive-russian-efforts-to-disrupt-2018-elections-1533235652 (last updated Aug. 3, 2018);
Jonathon Morgan & Ryan Fox, Russians Meddling in the Midterms? Here’s the Data, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/opinion/midterm-elections-russia
.html (suggesting that social media platforms’ measures “may have rendered some of the
Russian tactics of 2016 less effective” but also may “have merely caused Russia to shift or
develop new tactics,” contributing to “more overall activity in real time from continuing
Russian online influence operations targeting the midterm elections than has been dis-
closed by social media platforms”).
44 See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 3(10) (2017); PEW RESEARCH CTR., ELEC-
TION 2016: CAMPAIGNS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF NEWS 28 (2016).
45 Natasha Bertrand, Twitter Users Spreading Fake News Targeted Swing States in the Run-Up
to Election Day, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/fake-news-
and-propaganda-targeted-swing-states-before-election-2017-9.
46 See, e.g., Philip N. Howard et al., Algorithms, Bots, and Political Communication in the US
2016 Election: The Challenge of Automated Political Communication for Election Law and Adminis-
tration, 15 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 81, 83–84 (2018) (“Social bots . . . are social media
accounts equipped with algorithms that post, tweet, or message of their own accord. . . . In
addition, a growing amount of computationally intensive social science has demonstrated
that bots can have a political impact, not so much in changing voter opinion but in attack-
ing journalists and discrediting political leaders . . . .”).
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directed to the swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin,47 as
well as to the battlegrounds states of Ohio, Missouri, Florida, North Carolina,
and Colorado, during the 2016 presidential election.48  False news available
on online platforms—especially Facebook—played a significant role in influ-
encing members of the electorate leading up to the 2016 election.  More
than one quarter of voting-age adults visited a false news website in the final
weeks of the 2016 campaign.49  Indeed, in the months leading up to the elec-
tion, the top twenty fake news stories had more “engagements” (which
includes shares, reactions, and comments) on Facebook (with 8.7 million
engagements) than the twenty top hard news stories (with 7.3 million
engagements).50  In the final three months of the U.S. presidential cam-
paign, the top performing fake election news stories on Facebook generated
more engagements than the top stories from major news outlets such as the
New York Times, the Washington Post, Huffington Post, and NBC News,51 and
material generated by the Kremlin reached 126 million American Facebook
users.52  The top five false news stories were all pro-Trump and anti-Clinton,
as depicted in Figure 1.53
47 See Philip N. Howard et al., Social Media, News and Political Information During the US
Election: Was Polarizing Content Concentrated in Swing States? (Project on Computational Pro-
poganda, Working Paper No. 2017.8, 2017), https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/work-
ing-papers/social-media-news-and-political-information-during-the-us-election-was-
polarizing-content-concentrated-in-swing-states/. Trump won the Electoral College
because some eighty thousand votes went his way in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Penn-
sylvania. See, e.g., KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CYBERWAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS AND TROLLS
HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT 67 (2018).
48 See Bertrand, supra note 45 (noting that Russian bots targeted battleground states);
Charlie Mahtesian, What Are the Swing States in 2016?, POLITICO (June 15, 2016), https://
www.politico.com/blogs/swing-states-2016-election/2016/06/what-are-the-swing-states-in-
2016-list-224327 (listing swing states for the 2016 presidential election); see also Scott Jas-
chik, How Russian Bots Spread Fear at University in the U.S., INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/02/15/journal-article-explains-how-russian-
bots-created-fear-university-missouri (explaining how Russian bots targeted Missouri).
49 See Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump? Here’s What We
Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-
know-about-fake-news-in-the-2016-election.
50 Id.
51 See Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Out-
performed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.buzzfeednews
.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook
#.emA15rzd0.
52 See Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, NEW YORKER (Oct. 1,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-to-swing-
the-election-for-trump/.
53 See Silverman, supra note 51.
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FIGURE 1
Twitter was a primary target of Russia’s false news and misinformation
offensives during the 2016 election, as a St. Petersburg–based troll factory
known as the Internet Research Agency used Twitter as a vehicle to create
fake accounts to exacerbate political and social tensions in the United States
and to mislead U.S. voters.54  The Internet Research Agency controlled more
than three thousand Twitter accounts during the 2016 U.S. elections, and
another fifty thousand automated accounts were connected to the Russian
government,55 creating interferences that Twitter was unprepared to
handle.56
54 See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter Is Sweeping Out Fake Accounts Like




56 As Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey acknowledged during the September 2018 congres-
sional hearings, “[w]e found ourselves unprepared and ill-equipped for the immensity of
the problems we’ve acknowledged,” including “[a]buse, harassment, troll armies, propa-
ganda through bots and human coordination, disinformation campaigns and divisive filter
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False news, fake sites, and amplification originated by Russian operatives
continue to distort our information ecosystem, and these foreign operatives
have achieved their goals so successfully that domestic operatives with similar
motives are following their lead.  In the context of the partisan debate sur-
rounding the Senate confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court, for example, domestic sources of misinformation adopted
foreign operatives’ strategies to spread lies about Kavanaugh-accuser Chris-
tine Blasey Ford and her attorneys.  In conjunction with Ford’s testimony
before the Senate, the conservative website Right Wing News posted several
false news stories about Ford on its website and then deployed various
Facebook pages and accounts to proliferate these false stories.57
False news, misinformation, and conspiracy theories have also prolifer-
ated online outside of the election context, as in the case of Alex Jones’s
InfoWars conspiracy theories claiming that the Sandy Hook massacre never
occurred and that the government and victims’ families staged the news
events surrounding the massacre in an attempt to limit Americans’ Second
Amendment rights.58
In sum, today’s online marketplace of ideas is besieged by false news and
intentional misinformation, creating a host of problems for our modern
democracy, in which citizens increasingly rely upon the internet in general—
and social media sites like Twitter and Facebook in particular—for accessing
news and information.
III. FIXING THE FLAWS IN THE ONLINE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
A. The European Union’s Approach, the German Approach, and Potential
Regulatory Spillover to the United States
In response to the profound problems besieging the online marketplace
of ideas discussed above, it might be tempting to wave a magic wand to make
such unwanted content instantly disappear.  This is essentially the approach
bubbles.”  Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, Facebook and Twitter Testified Before Congress. Con-
servative Conspiracy Theorists Lurked Behind Them., WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/05/facebook-twitter-sandberg-dorsey-con-
gress-tech-hearings/?utm_term=.862c1ab2b3a5.
57 As the New York Times reports, while “domestic sites are emulating the Russian strat-
egy of 2016 by aggressively creating networks of Facebook pages and accounts—many of
them fake—that make it appear as if the ideas they are promoting enjoy widespread popu-
larity.”  Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Tackles Rising Threat: Americans Aping Russian Schemes to
Deceive, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/technology/
fake-news-online-disinformation.html?module=inline.
58 See Chris Sommerfeldt, See It: Right-Wing Conspiracy Theorist Alex Jones Doubles Down on
‘Completely Fake’ Sandy Hook Massacre Claims, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www
.nydailynews.com/news/politics/alex-jones-doubles-completely-fake-sandy-hook-claims-
article-1.2878305#; see also Vanessa Romo, Sandy Hook Parents Sue Conspiracy Theorist Alex
Jones over Claim Shooting Was ‘Fake,’ NPR (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2018/04/17/603223968/sandy-hook-parents-sue-conspiracy-theorist-alex-
jones-over-claim-shooting-was-fa.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 14 29-MAY-19 15:31
1532 notre dame law review [vol. 94:4
recently adopted by Germany, which builds on the European Union’s
approach and which starts from a different calculus of the harms caused by
free speech as weighed against its benefits.59  The European approach to fix-
ing the flaws in the online marketplace of ideas, which is dramatically differ-
ent from the United States’ approach, imposes substantial pressure on social
media platforms to monitor their content.  Consequently, platforms may end
up responding to these pressures in ways that affect what U.S. audiences can
view online.
The current German legislative approach to fixing the flaws in the
online marketplace of ideas builds upon an agreement—the EU Code of
Conduct—that Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Microsoft entered into with
the European Commission in 2016 (and that Google and Instagram have
recently joined) in which these companies agreed to rapidly remove online
hate speech upon receiving notice of the same.60  (In the European Union—
unlike in the United States under the Communications Decency Act (CDA)
230 regime61—online platforms can be held legally responsible for the illegal
content they host if they do not “expeditiously . . . remove or . . . disable
access” to such content.)62  Under the EU Code of Conduct, the companies
agree to remove from their platforms, within twenty-four hours of notifica-
tion, “illegal hate speech”—defined as “all conduct publicly inciting to vio-
lence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a
group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or
ethnic origin.”63  In a similar vein, the European Union has also recently
secured a commitment from Google, Facebook, and other online platforms
to adopt self-regulatory measures to address the spread of fake news and dis-
information.64  German lawmakers claimed that social media companies
59 For other examples of extreme approaches to the spread of fake news online, con-
sider Saudi Arabia’s approach, under which the sharing or spreading of fake news or
rumors that might affect public order and security is punishable by a five-year prison term
and three million Saudi riyal fine. See 5-Year Jail, 3 Million Fine for Rumormongers, SAUDI
GAZETTE (Oct. 13, 2018), http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/545523.
60 See European Commission Press Release IP/18/261, Countering Illegal Hate
Speech Online—Commission Initiative Shows Continued Improvement, Further Platforms
Join (Jan. 19, 2018); European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, European Commis-
sion and IT Companies Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech (May
31, 2016).
61 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); see also Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited Dec. 14, 2018)
(summarizing the impact of § 230).
62 See Council Directive 2000/31, pmbl. ¶ 46, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 6 (EC).
63 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE SPEECH
ONLINE 1 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/code_of_conduct_on_coun
tering_illegal_hate_speech_online_en.pdf.
64 In April, the European Commission instructed tech firms, including Facebook and
Google, to draft a code of practice to combat misleading and illegal content or face further
regulation.  In September 2018, the platforms agreed to a voluntary code, under which
they would reject payment from sites that spread fake news and distinguish advertisements
from editorial content, among other measures. See Foo Yun Chee, Facebook, Google to Tackle
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were not acting quickly and effectively enough to comply with the 2016 EU
Code of Conduct and argued that national legislation was necessary to hold
social media companies to account.  In response, in 2017 Germany enacted
legislation requiring social media companies to take swift, drastic, and censo-
rial actions in response to false news, hate speech, and similar harmful infor-
mation online that arguably distorts the online marketplace of ideas.65
Other European countries—and the European Union as a body itself—are
considering following suit.66  Germany’s parliament approved this legisla-
tion—the Network Enforcement Act (in German, Netzwerkdurchsetzung-
sgesetz or NetzDG for short)—on June 30, 2017, and the law took effect,
after a transitional period, on January 1, 2018.67  The law requires that social
media companies do the following: (1) block access within Germany to “man-
ifestly unlawful” content within twenty-four hours of receiving notice of any
such content, and (2) block access to other unlawful content (that is unlaw-
ful but not “manifestly” unlawful) within seven days of receiving such
notice.68  The NetzDG legislation imposes fines of up to fifty million euros
for noncompliance.69  Unlawful categories of speech that must be promptly
blocked includes content that is unlawful under various sections of the Ger-
man Criminal Code, including laws prohibiting hate speech, “public incite-
ment to crime,” “dissemination of depictions of violence,” forming criminal
or terrorist organizations, and defamation,70 to name a few.  The law does
Spread of Fake News, Advisors Want More, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-eu-tech-fakenews/facebook-google-agree-to-tackle-fake-news-eu-idUSKCN
1M61AG; Code of Practice on Disinformation, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 26, 2018), https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation.
65 See Overview of the NetzDG Network Enforcement Law, supra note 11.
66 Emma Thomasson, Germany Looks to Revise Social Media Law as Europe Watches,
REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-hatespeech/ger-
many-looks-to-revise-social-media-law-as-europe-watches-idUSKCN1GK1BN; see also Germany
Starts Enforcing Hate Speech Law, BBC (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technol-
ogy-42510868 (“The German law is the most extreme example of efforts by governments
and regulators to rein in social media firms.”).
67 See Flawed Social Media Law, supra note 12.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 Sections of the German Criminal Code referenced by the NetzDG legislation
include: Dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organizations (section
86), Using symbols of unconstitutional organizations (section 86a), Preparation of a seri-
ous violent offence endangering the state (section 89a), Defamation of the president (sec-
tion 90), Defamation of the state and its symbols (section 90a), Anti-constitutional
defamation of constitutional organs (section 90b), Encouraging the commission of a seri-
ous violent offence endangering the state (section 91), Treasonous forgery (section 100a),
Public incitement to crime (section 111), Breach of the public peace by threatening to
commit offences (section126), Forming criminal and terrorist organizations, domestically
and abroad (sections 129–129b) Incitement to hatred (section 130), Dissemination of
depictions of violence (section 131), Rewarding and approving of offences (section 140),
Defamation of religions, religious and ideological associations (section 166), Distribution,
acquisition, and possession of child pornography (section 184b), Distribution of porno-
graphic performances by broadcasting, media services, or telecommunications services
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not provide for any remedy for those whose content is wrongfully blocked
pursuant to NetzDG’s mandates, other than to complain to the social media
provider who blocked their content.71
Facebook, Twitter, and other large social media companies have been
scrambling to comply with the dictates of NetzDG since it became fully effec-
tive in January 2018.72  To implement the legislation’s mandates, Facebook
adopted new reporting mechanisms and hired thousands of employees to
review users’ reports of unlawful content.73  It also introduced new features
to flag controversial content and has spent months training its employees on
NetzDG’s requirements.74
Not surprisingly, NetzDG has been the subject of intense debate in Ger-
many in the months since its passage and has been criticized for imposing a
censorship regime, as well as for backfiring and actually increasing support
for groups and causes that have been censored under this regime.75
Facebook has implemented the legislation’s mandate by blocking thousands
of posts, including posts made by public officials and posts on matters that
are arguably of legitimate interest to the public.  For example, among the
very first posts that Facebook blocked once the law became effective was a
comment made by a government official criticizing the actions of the
Cologne police for posting a New Year’s greeting that provided safety advice
in German, English, French, and Arabic.76  In a New Year’s Eve post by the
deputy leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
party, Beatrix von Storch asked, “What the hell is happening in this country?
Why is an official police site tweeting in Arabic?  Do you think it is to appease
(section 184d), Insult and defamation (sections 185–187), Causing the danger of criminal
prosecution by informing on a person (section 241), and Forging of data intended to
provide proof (section 269). See Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network
Enforcement Act], June 30, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI].
71 See Thomasson, supra note 66.
72 See Philip Oltermann, Tough New German Law Puts Tech Firms and Free Speech in Spot-
light, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/05/tough-
new-german-law-puts-tech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spotlight.
73 See Flawed Social Media Law, supra note 12; see also Network Enforcement Act (“NetzDG”),
FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/285230728652028 (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018).
74 See Oltermann, supra note 72; see also What Happens After I Submit a Report Under the
NetzDG?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/499717357069620 (last
visited Sept. 28, 2018) (explaining to users what happens after they report alleged NetzDG
violations).
75 See Linda Kinstler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook Is Backfiring, ATLANTIC (May 18,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/germany-facebook-
afd/560435 (“Germany’s attempt to regulate speech online has seemingly amplified the
voices it was trying to diminish.”).
76 See id.; see also Philip Oltermann & Pádraig Collins, Two Members of Germany’s Far-
Right Party Investigated by State Prosecutor, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2018/jan/02/german-far-right-mp-investigated-anti-muslim-social-media-
posts.
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the barbaric, gang-raping hordes of Muslim men?”77  Referencing the Ger-
man penal code’s prohibition on speech that constitutes “incitement of the
people,” Facebook blocked the deputy leader’s post.78  Facebook has also
blocked posts that are critical of the AfD party and its leadership, including a
post that referred to the coleader of the party as a “Nazi pig.”79  Critics have
argued that NetzDG implements “Stasi methods” that are “reminiscent of
censorship in communist East Germany.”80  Opponents of the legislation also
contend that Facebook’s “delete when in doubt” practice has a chilling effect
on speech both online and offline,81 and that in the NetzDG era, “people are
more careful what to think, what to write” and “[l]ots of people are afraid of
losing of their accounts.”82  Critics also complain about the process through
which such censorship occurs.  They lament the fact that NetzDG has created
a regime in which “companies can play judges”83 and through which the
legislation “outsourc[es] censorship to private companies and infring[es] on
civil liberties.”84  As one public official complained, under NetzDG, “too
many competences that require legal expertise are delegated to tech compa-
nies.”85  In addition, critics claim that NetzDG has been enforced arbitrarily
and in a politically biased manner,86 and that the law has had the counter-
productive effect of shoring up support for those who have been censored.
In particular, opponents of the law lament the fact that Alternative für
Deutschland is “using the law to paint itself as a victim” and that its leaders
are now characterizing themselves as “opinion martyrs.”87
Facebook’s implementation of NetzDG’s mandate has also been subject
to legal challenges in which plaintiffs contend that blocking illegal content
77 See Chase Winter, AfD Politician ‘Censored’ Under New German Hate Speech Law for Anti-
Muslim Tweet, DW NEWS (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/afd-politician-censored-
under-new-german-hate-speech-law-for-anti-muslim-tweet/a-41992679.
78 See Oltermann, supra note 72.
79 See Jens Meyer-Wellmann, Alice Weidel Could Bring Facebook to Its Knees, HAMBURGER
ABENDBLATT (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.abendblatt.de/hamburg/article214139039/
Facebook-droht-Niederlage-gegen-AfD-Politikerin-Alice-Weidel.html.
80 See Oltermann, supra note 72.
81 See Sven Jacobs, Already Changes to the New German Law on Hate Speech on Social Media
on the Horizon?, SOC. MEDIA L. BULL. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.socialmedialawbulletin
.com/2018/03/already-changes-new-german-law-hate-speech-social-media-horizon;
Kinstler, supra note 75.
82 Kinstler, supra note 75 (quoting German internet lawyer Jeorg Heidrich).
83 Mark Scott & Janosch Delcker, Free Speech vs. Censorship in Germany, POLITICO (Jan. 4,
2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-hate-speech-netzdg-facebook-youtube-
google-twitter-free-speech.
84 Christof Kerkmann, German Court Overturns Facebook ‘Censorship,’ HANDELSBLATT
TODAY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/german-court-facebook-
censorship-910635.
85 Oltermann, supra note 72 (quoting Konstantin von Notz, member of Parliament).
86 See Kerkmann, supra note 84.
87 Oltermann, supra note 72; see also Kinstler, supra note 75 (describing the NetzDG’s
attempt to regulate online speech as “amplif[ying] the voices it was trying to diminish,”
specifically with regard to the AfD).
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within Germany is insufficient and that Facebook must block such content in
such a manner that Germans located outside of Germany are also prohibited
from accessing it.88  Depending on the result of these challenges, Facebook
may ultimately determine that the easiest way to comply with the law’s man-
date is to remove illegal content entirely, instead of blocking access to it
within Germany and for Germans outside Germany.
Twitter’s implementation of NetzDG has been similar to that of
Facebook and has resulted in similar controversies.  Like Facebook, Twitter
has created mechanisms for users to flag content as potentially illegal under
German law, hired new moderators to monitor these reports, and set up a
legal compliance office specifically for NetzDG.89  From January through
June 2018, Twitter users flagged over two hundred fifty thousand items as
illegal, and Twitter responded by removing ten percent of those items (and
removed the vast majority of such items within twenty-four hours, as man-
dated by NetzDG).90  The content that users flagged as illegal on Twitter and
Facebook is largely similar and has sparked similar concerns that the plat-
forms will resort to overreaction and overblocking.91  For example, like
Facebook, Twitter also removed the New Year’s Eve post by Alternative für
Deutschland deputy leader Beatrix von Storch,92 and also suspended
Storch’s account for breaching Twitter’s code of conduct.93  Both Facebook’s
88 In connection with a German Huffington Post article about Alice Weidel, coleader of
the AfD party, a user commented that Weidel was a “Nazi pig” and made disparaging
remarks about Weidel’s sexual orientation.  Meyer-Wellmann, supra note 79.  Weidel
demanded that the disparaging comments be blocked by Facebook, and Facebook com-
plied by making the user’s comments inaccessible to all Facebook users using a German IP
address.  See Kinstler, supra note 75.
89 See Shashi Jayakumar, Germany’s NetzDG: Template for Dealing with Fake News?, S.
RAJARATNAM SCH. OF INT’L STUD. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publica-
tion/cens/co18041-germanys-netzdg-template-for-dealing-with-fake-news/#.W7FI52aZM6i
(noting that Twitter has set up a legal compliance office specifically to handle issues arising
from NetzDG); Oltermann, supra note 72 (noting that Twitter has been hiring “more Ger-
man-language moderators with a background in law”); see also Thomasson, supra note 66
(reporting that Twitter “declined to comment on how it is implementing the law”).
90 Kirsten Gollatz et al., Removals of Online Hate Speech in Numbers, ALEXANDER VON HUM-
BOLDT INSTITUT FÜR INTERNET UND GESELLSCHAFT (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.hiig.de/
en/removals-of-online-hate-speech-numbers.
91 James McAuley, France Weighs a Law to Rein in ‘Fake News,’ Raising Fears for Freedom of
Speech, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/
france-weighs-a-law-to-rein-in-fake-news-raising-fears-for-freedom-of-speech/2018/01/10/
78256962-f558-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.c77faf5ba81a (reporting
that Twitter removed a tweet “criticiz[ing] German authorities for allegedly failing to pur-
sue xenophobia investigations”); see also Kinstler, supra note 75 (“[M]any other Facebook
and Twitter users have seen their posts flagged or removed because of the new regulation
without quite knowing why.”).
92 See Oltermann, supra note 72.
93 Id. (highlighting the suspension of a German satirical magazine’s Twitter account
after the magazine, called Titanic, tweeted a parody of Storch’s tweet); see also Scott &
Delcker, supra note 83 (reporting Twitter’s refusal to comment on the Titanic case, but
quoting Twitter as stating that “under certain circumstances, potentially harmful tweets
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and Twitter’s actions in response to Storch’s and similar posts have been sub-
ject to criticisms that the companies are engaging in censorship of political
speech.94
Separate and apart from the debate in Germany over NetzDG and its
implementation, such an approach to fixing the flaws in the online market-
place of ideas could never pass constitutional muster in the United States.
Given the First Amendment’s heavy presumption against prior restraints on
speech as well as the First Amendment’s underlying broader protections for
hate speech, incendiary speech, etc., an approach like that taken in Ger-
many—in which the government mandates that social media companies
immediately block access to content in response to users’ flagging such con-
tent as illegal—would stand no chance of passing constitutional muster in
the United States.  Notwithstanding the fact that NetzDG (and the EU Code
of Conduct) require social media companies to block content after it has
been published on the internet, these regulations nevertheless require that
such content be blocked prior to a judicial determination of the content’s
illegality.95  Under First Amendment jurisprudence, any state-mandated cen-
sorship that occurs outside the context of a judicial determination of the
content’s illegality—even censorship that occurs after the content is initially
published—is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.96  Accordingly,
may run against the company’s existing terms and conditions and not be linked to the new
German hate speech rules”).
94 See, e.g., Scott & Delcker, supra note 83.
95 See Kerkmann, supra note 84 (criticizing the NetzDG law for “outsourcing censor-
ship to private companies and infringing on civil liberties”).
96 As I explain elsewhere, regardless of whether censorship occurs ex ante—before
publication or posting on the internet—or midstream—at some point after the content
has been posted—extrajudicial censorship constitutes a presumptively illegal prior
restraint. See Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values and
Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1143 (2011).  Examples of the former
include those imposed by prescreening film boards and internet filtering schemes that are
imposed ex ante. See id. at 1144.  Midstream prior restraints include those imposed after
initial publication but before a judicial determination of the content’s illegality. See id.
Because midstream prior restraints are imposed in the absence of the procedural safe-
guards that attend a judicial determination, they are as constitutionally suspect as ex ante
prior restraints. See id. Midstream prior restraints include state-mandated notice and take
down systems like those imposed under the NetzDG legislation. See id. The Supreme
Court has struck down midstream prior restraints in cases such as Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 (1963).  In that case, the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage
Morality in Youth was charged by the state with investigating and recommending prosecu-
tion of booksellers for distributing books that were obscene or indecent. Id. at 59–60.  The
Commission reviewed books after they were already in circulation and notified distributors
when they distributed a book that the Commission deemed objectionable. Id. at 61.  Upon
receipt of such notices, many distributors stopped further circulation of the identified
works. Id. at 63.  In reviewing the constitutionality of the Rhode Island scheme, the
Supreme Court held that even though the restrictions on publication were imposed mid-
stream—after initial circulation and distribution—the actions nonetheless effectuated an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 64, 70.  The Court explained that “[t]he separation
of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for . . . sensitive tools,” id. (omission in original)
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if the U.S. government imposed a similar mandate on digital platforms, such
a mandate would be clearly unconstitutional.
Yet, given the pressures that the 2018 NetzDG law and the 2016 EU
Code of Conduct are placing on social media companies to block content
that is illegal in Germany and Europe in a manner that renders such content
inaccessible for Germans and Europeans wherever they may be located, these
international approaches to fixing the flaws in the online marketplace of
ideas may well have an effect on the marketplace of ideas as it is accessed by
U.S. citizens as well.
B. What Facebook Is Doing
In addition to complying with the mandates from the European Union
under the EU Code of Conduct and the new EU Code of Practice on Dis-
information, and from Germany under its NetzDG legislation described
above, and in addition to removing content that violates its own community
standards,97 Facebook is taking a number of steps to attempt to remedy the
flaws in the online marketplace of ideas.98  As discussed above, Facebook’s
platform was subject to manipulation by Russian hackers who disseminated
false news and disinformation on a massive scale during the period leading
up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election.99  After being subject to intense
scrutiny from Congress and intense criticism from the court of public opin-
ion in the United States, Facebook recently announced and implemented
several measures to attempt to address these problems on its platform,100
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)), and reiterated its “insistence that
regulations of [illegal content] scrupulously embody the most rigorous procedural safe-
guards.” Id. at 66.  The Court observed that, under the Rhode Island scheme, “[t]he pub-
lisher or distributor is not even entitled to notice and hearing before his publications are
listed by the Commission as objectionable” and that there was “no provision whatever for
judicial superintendence before notices issue or even for judicial review of the Commis-
sion’s determinations of objectionableness.” Id. at 71.  Accordingly, in the context of this
midstream prior restraint, the “procedures of the Commission [were] radically deficient”
and unconstitutional. Id.
97 Facebook’s community standards prohibit posting the following types of content:
violence and criminal behavior, suicide and self-injury, child nudity and sexual exploita-
tion of children, sexual exploitation of adults, bullying, harassment, privacy violations,
objectionable content, hate speech, violence and graphic content, adult nudity and sexual
activity, sexual solicitation, cruel and insensitive content, spam, misrepresentation, and
content violating others’ intellectual property. See Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https:/
/www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).  A full list of
Facebook’s community standards, as well as definitions of prohibited categories of content,
can be found in Appendix A.
98 See Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: What’s Facebook’s Strategy for Stopping False News?,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 23, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/hard-
questions-false-news.
99 See Mayer, supra note 52.
100 False news or fake news is not per se in violation of Facebook’s community stan-
dards.  As Facebook explains, “There is . . . a fine line between false news and satire or
opinion.  For these reasons, we don’t remove false news from Facebook but instead, signifi-
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including by securing independent evaluation of certain content for its accu-
racy, deprioritizing inaccurate content, and penalizing purveyors of false con-
tent; securing and providing truthful counterspeech in response to false
content; adopting a political advertising policy; removing content that incites
imminent violence; and engaging in ongoing educational efforts.  More spe-
cifically, as  this Section discusses in detail below, Facebook’s recently
adopted measures to combat false news on its platform include partnering
with independent third-party fact-checkers to evaluate posts; providing
counterspeech in the form of “Related Articles”/“Additional Reporting on
This” on topics similar to false articles posted on Facebook; limiting the dis-
tribution of posts from content providers who repeatedly share false news
and eliminating their ability to profit; removing false posts that are intended
to encourage violence; eliminating fake accounts; modifying its “news feed”
functionality by prioritizing interactive content and allowing users to custom-
ize their feeds; and engaging in educational efforts regarding news liter-
acy.101  Section III.B discusses each of these efforts in turn below and
analyzes their likely effectiveness in remedying the flaws in the online market-
place of ideas.  This Section also assesses the extent to which these efforts are
consistent with the marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment.
1. Partnering with Third-Party Fact-Checkers to Evaluate Potentially False
Posts
Facebook is continuing to expand the partnership that it began in
December 2016 with fact-checkers to evaluate content posted on its plat-
form.102  Through its fact-checking initiatives, Facebook is working with inde-
pendent third-party fact-checkers, which are certified through the
nonpartisan International Fact-Checking Network.103  In the United States,
the certified fact-checking organizations with whom Facebook works are the
Associated Press, FactCheck.org, Lead Stories, and PolitiFact104  (Facebook
had added the Weekly Standard to these ranks for a period of time in an
attempt to respond to critics who claimed that its fact-checking program was
cantly reduce its distribution by showing it lower in the News Feed.” False News, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/false_news (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
101 See Hunt Allcott et al., Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media app. at
4 tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25500, 2019), http://web.stan
ford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fake-news-trends-appx.pdf (listing all of Facebook’s efforts
to combat false news).
102 See Lyons, supra note 98.
103 See id.
104 See Mike Ananny, Checking In with The Facebook Fact-Checking Partnership, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebook-fact-checking-
partnerships.php; see also How Are Third-Party Fact-Checkers Selected?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1599660546745980?helpref=faq_content (last visited
Sept. 29, 2018); Third-Party Fact-Checking on Facebook, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www
.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
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politically biased, but this publication is now defunct).105  Facebook has
expanded its fact-checking initiative to include the fact-checking of all public,
newsworthy Facebook posts, including links, articles, photos, and videos.106
The fact-checking process can be initiated by Facebook users flagging a post
as being potentially false.  To do so, a user clicks “. . .” next to the post he or
she wishes to flag as false, then clicks “Report post,” then clicks “It’s a false
news story,” then clicks “Mark this post as false news.”107  (Alternatively, a
user can click “. . .” next to a post, then click “Give Feedback on This Post,”
then click “False News.”)108  Once a post is flagged by a user as a potential
false news story, it is submitted for evaluation to a third-party independent
fact-checker.109  While the process of evaluating posts in the past was trig-
gered only by user flagging, Facebook now incorporates other ways of trigger-
ing such evaluation, including by providing its independent fact-checkers
with the authority to proactively identify posts to review110 as well as by using
machine learning to identify potentially false posts.111  For each piece of con-
tent up for review, a fact-checker has the option of providing one of eight
different ratings: false, mixture, false headline, true, not eligible (if, for
example, the post is not verifiable, opinion, etc.), satire, opinion, or prank
generator.112
2. Related Articles/Additional Reporting as Counterspeech and Other
Remedies in Response to False News
Once a third-party fact-checker has determined that a post is false,
Facebook then initiates several steps.  First, Facebook deprioritizes false posts
in users’ news feeds, i.e., the constantly updating list of stories in the middle
of a user’s home page (including status updates, photos, videos, links, app
105 See Matthew Ingram, The Weekly Standard and the Flaws in Facebook’s Fact-Checking
Program, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/the_new_gate
keepers/the-weekly-standard-facebook.php.
106 See Antonia Woodford, Expanding Fact-Checking to Photos and Videos, FACEBOOK NEWS-
ROOM (Sept. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/expanding-fact-
checking.
107 See How Do I Mark a Post as False News?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook
.com/help/572838089565953?helpref=faq_content (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
108 See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
109 See Lyons, supra note 14 (“[W]hen people on Facebook submit feedback about a
story being false or comment on an article expressing disbelief, these are signals that a
story should be reviewed.”).
110 See id. (“Independent third-party fact-checkers review the stories, rate their accu-
racy, and write an article explaining the facts behind their rating.”).
111 See Dan Zigmond, Machine Learning, Fact-Checkers and the Fight Against False News,





112 Third-Party Fact-Checking on Facebook, supra note 104.
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activity, and likes)—such that future views of each false post will be reduced
by an average of eighty percent.113  Second, Facebook commissions a fact-
checker to write a related article or “Additional Reporting on This,” setting
forth truthful information about the subject of the false post and the reasons
why the fact-checker rated the post as false.114  Such content is then dis-
played in conjunction with the false post on the same subject.115  While
Facebook formerly flagged false news sites with a “Disputed” flag, the com-
pany changed its approach in response to research suggesting that such flags
may actually entrench beliefs in the disputed posts.116  Facebook now pro-
vides “Related Articles”/“Additional Reporting on This” in conjunction with
false news stories (which apparently does not result in similar entrench-
ment).117  In addition, users who attempt to share the false post will be noti-
fied that the post has been disputed and will be informed of the availability of
a “Related Article”/“Additional Reporting on This,” as will users who earlier
shared the false post,118 as in Figure 2 below.119
113 See id.; see also Tessa Lyons, Increasing Our Efforts to Fight False News, FACEBOOK NEWS-
ROOM (June 21, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/increasing-our-efforts-
to-fight-false-news/.
114 Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Fell for Facebook Fake News. Here’s Why Millions of You Did, Too.,
WASH. POST. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/18/
i-fell-facebook-fake-news-heres-why-millions-you-did-too/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8b17ea23b1c2; see Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags with
Related Articles, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/
2017/12/news-feed-fyi-updates-in-our-fight-against-misinformation.
115 See Lyons, supra note 114; see also Fowler, supra note 114 (describing steps under-
taken by Facebook to respond to fake video, including posting “Additional Reporting on
This,” with links to reports from fact-checking organizations); Lyons, supra note 14; Sara
Su, New Test with Related Articles, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 25, 2017), https://news-
room.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feed-fyi-new-test-with-related-articles.
116 See Catherine Shu, Facebook Will Ditch Disputed Flags on Fake News and Display Links to
Trustworthy Articles Instead, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 20, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/
12/20/facebook-will-ditch-disputed-flags-on-fake-news-and-display-links-to-trustworthy-arti-
cles-instead/.
117 See Lyons, supra note 114 (“Academic research on correcting misinformation has
shown that putting a strong image, like a red flag, next to an article may actually entrench
deeply held beliefs . . . .  Related Articles, by contrast, are simply designed to give more
context, which our research has shown is a more effective way to help people get to the
facts. . . . [W]e’ve found that when we show Related Articles next to a false news story, it
leads to fewer shares than when the Disputed Flag is shown.”).
118 See Lyons, supra note 14.
119 Elle Hunt, ‘Disputed by Multiple Fact-Checkers’: Facebook Rolls Out New Alert to Combat
Fake News, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/
mar/22/facebook-fact-checking-tool-fake-news.
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FIGURE 2
Third, content providers—i.e., Facebook pages and domains—that
repeatedly publish and/or share false posts will lose their ability to monetize
and advertise unless and until they issue corrections or successfully dispute
fact-checkers’ determinations that their posts are false.120
120 See Satwik Shukla & Tessa Lyons, Blocking Ads from Pages That Repeatedly Share False
News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 28, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/08/
blocking-ads-from-pages-that-repeatedly-share-false-news.
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3. Transparency and Disclosure Requirements Regarding Political/
Electioneering Advertisements
Facebook also implemented a political advertising policy in May 2018.121
The political advertising policy requires, first, that every election-related and
issue advertisement made available on Facebook to users in the United States
be clearly labeled as a “Political Ad” and include a “paid for by” disclosure,
with the name of the individual or organization who paid for the advertise-
ment at the top of the advertisement.122  Second, under the policy, Facebook
will collect and maintain a publicly available archive of political advertise-
ments, which will provide information regarding the campaign budget associ-
ated with each individual ad and how many people saw it, including their
ages, locations, and genders.123  Third, under the policy, Facebook will pro-
hibit foreign entities from purchasing political ads directed at U.S. audi-
ences.124  Facebook will implement this prohibition by mailing prospective
political advertisers a postcard sent to a U.S. address in order to verify U.S.
residency.  If a prospective purchaser of a political ad is not verified under
this process, it will not be able to post a political advertisement on Facebook
and will be blocked from purchasing political ads in the future.  Comment-
ing on the recently implemented political advertising policy, Facebook’s
CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, explained, “These changes won’t fix everything, but
they will make it a lot harder for anyone to do what the Russians did during
the 2016 election and use fake accounts and pages to run ads.”125
Facebook’s recently implemented measures imposing disclosure require-
ments on political ads and limiting foreign entities from purchasing political
ads go beyond those that are encompassed in the proposed Honest Ads Act,
discussed below,126 and manifest a commitment from Facebook to take seri-
ously its responsibility to address the problems of foreign interference in the
U.S. political process.
4. Removing False Posts Intended and Likely to Encourage Violence
In addition to demoting posts that have been determined by fact-check-
ers to be false, for some types of particularly harmful content, Facebook will
remove content altogether.  In response to criticism that it contributed to
violence against religious and ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and
121 See Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More Transparent, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Apr. 6, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-ads-and-
pages/.
122 See id.
123 See Rob Leathern, Shining a Light on Ads with Political Content, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(May 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-political-content/.
124 See Ads Related to Politics or Issues of National Importance, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www
.facebook.com/business/help/167836590566506 (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
125 Josh Constine, Facebook and Instagram Launch US Political Ad Labeling and Archive,
TECHCRUNCH (May 24, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/24/facebook-political-
ad-archive/.
126 See infra Section III.D.
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India by hosting rumors that led to real-world attacks,127 Facebook
announced a policy in July 2018 under which it would remove false informa-
tion that is intended to incite violence and other physical harm.128  Under
this new policy, Facebook will remove posts (including text and images) that
have been created or shared with the purpose of immediately “contributing
to or exacerbating violence or physical harm.”129  To implement the policy,
Facebook intends to work with local and international organizations, as well
as with its own internal image recognition technologies, to identify such con-
tent for removal.130
5. Eliminating Fake Accounts
Facebook has also undertaken measures to eliminate fake accounts,131
i.e., accounts that misrepresent the true identity of the account holder, such
as Macedonians pretending to be Americans in order to spread false posts on
Facebook.132  Foreign and domestic operatives have used fake accounts and
pages with increasing frequency in past months to make themselves appear
more popular.133  In October 2018, Facebook identified for removal “559
pages and 251 accounts run by Americans, many of which amplified false and
misleading content in a coordinated fashion,” including Right Wing News,
discussed above, and left-wing pages, including the Resistance and Reverb
Press, each of which had several hundreds of thousands of followers.134
These sites targeted for removal amounted to the greatest number of domes-
tic pages and accounts that Facebook has ever removed related to election
interference.135
127 See Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, In Search of Facebook’s Heroes, Finding Only Victims,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/insider/facebook-vic-
tims-sri-lanka.html?module=inline; Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Where Countries Are Tinder-
boxes and Facebook Is a Match, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
04/21/world/asia/facebook-sri-lanka-riots.html?module=inline.
128 See Michelle Castillo, Facebook Will Begin Taking Down Fake News Intended to Encourage
Violence, CNBC (July 18, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/facebook-to-take-
down-fake-news-intended-to-encourage-violence.html; The Country Where Facebook Posts
Whipped Up Hate, BBC (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-
45449938 (describing various factors that led to the weaponization of Facebook against
Rohingyas in Myanmar).  Facebook has already implemented this policy in Sri Lanka to
remove posts in Sri Lanka alleging that Muslims were poisoning food that was given or sold
to Buddhists. See Castillo, supra. 
129 Castillo, supra note 128.
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Tony Romm & Drew Harwell, Facebook Disabled 583 Million Fake Accounts and
Millions of Spam, Sex and Hate Speech Posts, WASH. POST (May 15, 2018), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/15/facebook-disabled-583-million-fake-
accounts-and-millions-of-spam-sex-and-hate-speech-posts/?utm_term=.e52e7575e7af.
132 See Samanth Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED (Feb. 15,
2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news.
133 See Frenkel, supra note 57.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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6. Providing Contextual and Source Information
Facebook is also providing more contextual information about the
sources of information made available on its platform by placing an “i” icon
on the bottom right of posts that users can click to access information from
Wikipedia about the source of the posted information.136  In addition,
Facebook is undertaking a variety of efforts to educate its users on news liter-
acy and to instruct users on how to distinguish between false posts and accu-
rate posts.137
7. Allowing Users to Rank Trustworthiness of News Sources
Facebook recently introduced a new scoring system that will allow users
to assign news organizations “trust scores,” which will be among the factors
used to determine how frequently a source appears in a news feed.138  News
organizations that score higher will have their articles more widely distrib-
uted.139  The scoring system’s survey will ask a “diverse and representative”
sample of users “if they’ve heard of a news outlet and how much they trust
it.”140
8. Modifying News Feed
Facebook has also modified its news feed functionality in a number of
ways and now allows users to customize their news feeds.  First, as discussed
above, Facebook significantly reduces the news feed rank of each post that
fact-checkers have determined to be false, such that the post’s future views
will be reduced by an average of eighty percent.141  Second, as of early 2018,
Facebook has begun prioritizing interactive content over passive content
within its news feed algorithm, such that posts that have received multiple
likes, reactions, comments, and shares—especially from a user’s closest
friends (i.e., those with whom the user interacts the most)—will be priori-
136 See Andrew Anker et al., New Test to Provide Context About Articles, FACEBOOK NEWS-
ROOM (Oct. 5, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/news-feed-fyi-new-test-to-
provide-context-about-articles. But see Louise Matsakis, Don’t Ask Wikipedia to Cure the
Internet, WIRED (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/youtube-wikipedia-content-
moderation-internet.
137 Lyons, supra note 14 (“We also continue to invest in news literacy programs to help
people better judge the publishers and articles they see on Facebook.”).
138 Jacob Kastrenakes, Facebook Begins Rating Users on How Trustworthy They Are at Flagging
Fake News, VERGE (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/21/17763886/
facebook-trust-ratings-fake-news-reporting-score; see Adam Mosseri, Helping Ensure News on
Facebook Is from Trusted Sources, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 19, 2018), https://newsroom.fb
.com/news/2018/01/trusted-sources.
139 Mosseri, supra note 128.
140 Heather Kelly, Facebook to Rank News Outlets by Trustworthiness, CNNMONEY (Jan. 19,
2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/19/technology/facebook-news-trustworthy/
index.html?iid=EL.
141 See Lyons, supra note 14.
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tized in the news feed.142  In another aspect of its news feed modifications,
Facebook is now allowing users to customize their news feeds by choosing
which posts to see first and/or to hide posts that they do not wish to see.143
9. Analysis of Facebook’s Efforts
Facebook’s efforts to remedy the flaws in the online marketplace of ideas
are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny, since it is not a state actor; how-
ever, the measures that Facebook has implemented in the United States are
largely consistent with the marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amend-
ment and some of these efforts appear to be effective in achieving their goals.
First, Facebook’s efforts in response to false speech to develop and post
“Related Articles”/“Additional Reporting on This” center on providing
counterspeech and promoting exposure to diverse and conflicting view-
points, instead of implementing censorship as a remedy.  As discussed above,
since the formative years of modern First Amendment jurisprudence, the
accepted response to bad speech is not censorship but more speech and
142 See Seth Fiegerman & Laurie Segall, Facebook to Show More Content from Friends, Less
from Publishers and Brands, CNNMONEY (Jan. 11, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/
11/technology/facebook-news-feed-change/index.html?iid=EL (describing the change as
a “‘rebalancing’ of how Facebook’s algorithms rank items in the main feed”); Mark Zuck-
erberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/
10104413015393571?pnref=story (“Facebook has always been about personal connections.
By focusing on bringing people closer together—whether it’s with family and friends, or
around important moments in the world—we can help make sure that Facebook is time
well spent.”).  Facebook based this change in its algorithms to prioritize posts from close
friends and family over public content on research showing that using social media to
connect with others correlates with greater happiness, health, and well-being, compared to
“passively” consuming information from public articles or videos.  Fiegerman & Segall,
supra (explaining why this change is unlikely to impact ads, which operate separately from
the news feed system, because businesses can “sidestep this shift” by spending more money
on ads to promote their content); Adam Mosseri, Bringing People Closer Together, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Jan. 11, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/01/news-feed-fyi-bring-
ing-people-closer-together (“Because space in News Feed is limited, showing more posts
from friends and family and updates that spark conversation means we’ll show less public
content, including videos and other posts from publishers or businesses. . . . Using ‘engage-
ment-bait’ to goad people into commenting on posts is not a meaningful interaction, and
we will continue to demote these posts in News Feed.”).  Former Facebook Vice President
of Product Adam Mosseri expressed confidence that this change would improve the filter
bubble issue because it will showcase conversations with friends over publishers.
Fiegerman & Segall, supra (quoting Mosseri saying, “You pick a publisher based on your
interests, which are more correlated with your beliefs . . . You pick a friend for lots of
different reasons. . . . Because this [change] is naturally good for friend content and for
conversation, it’s actually going to be good for the diversity of opinion in News Feed.”
(alteration in original)).  Other commentators challenge this assumption.  For example,
CNN’s Seth Fiegerman and Laurie Segall claim, “By prioritizing content that sparks con-
versations, Facebook could risk promoting more polarizing and opinionated posts that
generate lots of comments, only adding to the filter bubble.” Id.
143 Control What You See in News Feed, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/
help/964154640320617/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
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more counterspeech.  The responses of counterspeech and of facilitating
exposure to diverse and conflicting viewpoints were credited by the Supreme
Court and implemented by the legislature in the mid- and late-twentieth cen-
tury in the context of the fairness doctrine for broadcast144 and the must-
carry doctrine for cable.145  These doctrines were upheld by the Supreme
Court as consistent with the First Amendment.146  The Federal Communica-
tions Commission’s fairness doctrine imposed on broadcasters the obligation
(among others) to afford a reasonable opportunity for discussion of compet-
ing points of view and controversial issues of public importance.  In uphold-
ing the fairness doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme
Court emphasized “the First Amendment goal of producing an informed
public capable of conducting its own affairs” and “the ‘public interest’ in . . .
the presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and
concern to the public.”147  The must-carry doctrine, which required cable
systems operators to carry the signals of local commercial and noncommer-
cial educational public broadcast television stations, was upheld by the Court
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.148  As the Court explained in
upholding the must-carry doctrine, “it has long been a basic tenet of national
communications policy that ‘the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public.’”149  Facebook’s efforts to present users with information from
diverse and antagonistic sources are consistent with the marketplace of ideas
model and the values of counterspeech embodied in this model.  These
efforts contribute toward “producing an informed public capable of con-
ducting its own affairs” and facilitating the preconditions necessary for citi-
zens to engage in the task of democratic self-government.150  Facebook’s
efforts to procure and post “Related Articles”/“Additional Reporting on
This” in response to false speech—and to attempt to draw users’ attention to
such counterspeech and away from false speech—is far more consistent with
American free speech values than is the censorial approach mandated by the
European Union and by Germany in particular, which requires Facebook to
block access to a wide array of speech flagged as illegal by users.
Further, Facebook’s efforts to reduce the audience of purveyors of false
news and ultimately to remove those purveyors’ ability to communicate via its
144 See Jerome A. Barron, The Federal Communications Commission’s Fairness Doctrine: An
Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1961).
145 See Matthew D. Bunker & Charles N. Davis, The First Amendment as a Sword: The Posi-
tive Liberty Doctrine and Cable Must-Carry Provisions, 40 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA
77 (1996).
146 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (cable); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcast).
147 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 385, 392.
148 512 U.S. 622.
149 Id. at 663–64 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27
(1972) (plurality opinion)).
150 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 392.
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platform are generally consistent with the limited protection for false and
harmful statements of fact under the Court’s defamation jurisprudence.
In addition, Facebook’s recently implemented measure of removing
false information likely to incite violence is consistent with the emergency
exception to the marketplace of ideas model, as originally articulated by
Holmes and Brandeis151 and as recognized by the Court in its incitement
jurisprudence in Brandenburg v. Ohio and its progeny.  The content that
Facebook does remove under its new policies—i.e., content that was created
or shared with the purpose of immediately contributing to or exacerbating
violence or physical harm—is content that would generally be subject to gov-
ernment regulation under the First Amendment’s incitement jurisprudence,
under which the government is permitted to regulate “advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation . . . where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”152
Other efforts undertaken by Facebook to remedy the flaws in the online
marketplace of ideas appear less likely to comport with First Amendment
values and less likely to be effective in fixing the flaws in the online market-
place of ideas.  Measures like allowing people to customize their news feeds
to prioritize posts from friends and family over public content—as well as
allowing users to rank the trustworthiness of news sources—seem likely to
entrench information silos and filter bubbles.  Such measures, which are
likely to limit users exposure to content from a diverse array of sources, run
counter to the important First Amendment goals of promoting “the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources”
to advance the welfare of the public.153
As one of the most important forums for expression in the United
States, Facebook should continue to focus on implementing remedies to fix
the flaws in the online marketplace of ideas that are consistent with First
Amendment values, including its recent measures focusing on counterspeech
instead of censorship as a response to false speech.
Recent empirical studies suggest that Facebook’s efforts to combat false
news have been moderately successful.  As Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow,
and Chuan Yu report in the October 2018 article Trends in the Diffusion of
Misinformation on Social Media, based on their study of “trends in the diffusion
of content from 570 fake news websites and 10,240 fake news stories on
Facebook and Twitter between January 2015 and July 2018,” while “[u]ser
interactions with false content rose steadily on . . . Facebook . . . through the
end of 2016,” since then, “interactions with false content have fallen
sharply.”154  The authors of the study find that “user interaction with known
151 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
152 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
153 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 663–64 (quoting Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. at
668 n.27).
154 Allcott et al., supra note 101, at 1.
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false news sites has declined by 50 percent since the 2016 election.”155  Based
on these findings, the authors conclude that “efforts by Facebook following
the 2016 election to limit the diffusion of misinformation [namely, the “suite
of policy and algorithmic changes made by Facebook following the election”]
may have had a meaningful impact.”156  In light of these findings, Facebook
should work to identify which of its efforts have been most successful in limit-
ing user interaction with known false news sites and should redouble such
efforts.
C. What Twitter Is Doing
In addition to complying with the mandates from the European
Union—under the EU Code of Conduct and the new EU Code of Practice
on Disinformation—and from Germany under its NetzDG legislation, and in
addition to removing content that violates its own terms of service,157 Twitter
has implemented a number of measures to attempt to remedy the flaws in
the online marketplace of ideas, and is contemplating the implementation of
additional measures.  Twitter’s response to the flaws in the online market-
place of ideas—and especially to the issues caused by Russian operatives’ use
of fake Twitter accounts on a massive scale to interfere with U.S. elections—
has been largely focused on suspending fake and suspicious accounts,158 and
has recently embraced regulation of political advertising as well.  Twitter has
also modified its algorithms to prioritize the highest quality and most rele-
vant content.
1. Suspending Fake and Suspicious Accounts
In the wake of congressional pressure, Twitter has sharply escalated its
efforts to remove fake and suspicious accounts by suspending over one mil-
lion accounts per day in recent months in an attempt to limit the spread of
false news and misinformation via its platform.159  Indeed, in May and June
2018 alone, Twitter suspended over seventy million accounts.160  This aggres-
sive campaign against bots is a reaction to Russia’s social media disinforma-
155 Fowler, supra note 114; see Allcott et al., supra note 101, at 5.
156 Allcott et al., supra note 101, at 3, 6.
157 The “Twitter Rules,” which are included in the “Twitter User Agreement,” prevent
users from posting the following types of content, as set forth more fully in Appendix B:
content that violates others’ intellectual property rights, graphic violence and adult con-
tent, distribution of hacked materials, misuse of usernames, abusive behavior, violence and
physical harm, suicide or self-harm, child sexual exploitation, unwanted sexual advances,
abuse and hateful conduct, hateful imagery and display names, private information, inti-
mate media, threats to expose/hack, and impersonation. The Twitter Rules, TWITTER HELP
CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules (last visited Dec. 3,
2018).
158 See Timberg & Dwoskin, supra note 54; see also Allcott et al., supra note 101, at 5
(detailing a smaller set of initiatives to combat false news compared to Facebook’s efforts).
159 See Timberg & Dwoskin, supra note 54.
160 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 32 29-MAY-19 15:31
1550 notre dame law review [vol. 94:4
tion campaign during the 2016 elections, particularly with regard to the St.
Petersburg–based troll factory known as the Internet Research Agency.161
Recently, Twitter has also been responding to efforts by domestic opera-
tives to mimic the “success” of foreign operatives by flooding the Twitter plat-
form with misinformation.  In October 2018, Twitter took down a network of
fifty accounts that were being run by Americans posing as Republican state
lawmakers and that were targeting voters in all fifty states.162  In addition, in
the two-month period leading up to the 2018 midterm elections, Twitter
deleted more than ten thousand automated accounts posting messages that
discouraged people from voting in the election and that falsely appeared to
come from Democrats.163  Twitter has also recently modified its policies gov-
erning the removal of fake accounts.  As announced in an October 1, 2018,
blog post entitled An Update on Our Elections Integrity Work, Twitter has
expanded its ability to remove fake accounts.164  Twitter explained:
[W]e are updating and expanding our rules to better reflect how we identify
fake accounts, and what types of inauthentic activity violate our guidelines.
We now may remove fake accounts engaged in a variety of emergent, mali-
cious behaviors.  Some of the factors that we will take into account when
determining whether an account is fake include:
–Use of stock or stolen avatar photos
–Use of stolen or copied profile bios
–Use of intentionally misleading profile information, including profile
location.165
In this post, Twitter further explained:
[I]f we are able to reliably attribute an account on Twitter to an entity
known to violate the Twitter Rules, we will take action on additional
accounts associated with that entity.  We are expanding our enforcement
approach to include accounts that deliberately mimic or are intended to
replace accounts we have previously suspended for violating our rules.166
161 See id.
162 Frenkel, supra note 57.
163 Christopher Bing, Exclusive: Twitter Deletes over 10,000 Accounts That Sought to Discour-
age U.S. Voting, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-
twitter-exclusive/exclusive-twitter-deletes-over-10000-accounts-seeking-to-discourage-voting-
idUSKCN1N72FA; Ben Collins, In Secret Chats, Trolls Struggle to Get Twitter Disinformation
Campaigns off the Ground, NBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-
news/secret-chats-trolls-struggle-get-twitter-disinformation-campaigns-ground-n931756.
164 Del Harvey & Yoel Roth, An Update on Our Elections Integrity Work, TWITTER BLOG
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2. Mechanisms for User Reporting of Content and Accounts
In contrast to Facebook, Twitter does not provide a mechanism for users
to trigger a fact-checking inquiry in the veracity of posts.167  Twitter does
provide a tool for viewers to report content168 and/or to report entire
accounts.  In connection with each tweet, Twitter allows users to click
“Report Tweet,” which provides the following options: (1) “I’m not interested
in this Tweet,” (2) “It’s suspicious or spam,” (3) “It’s abusive or harmful.”169
Twitter also allows users to report entire accounts as being “abusive or harm-
ful.”170  In addition, Twitter allows users to block and/or mute accounts that
they do not wish to view tweets from.171
3. Demoting Tweets from Bad Faith Actors
Twitter is also employing the measure of limiting the reach of tweets
from “bad-faith actors who intend to manipulate or divide . . . healthy public
conversation” by placing such tweets lower down in the stream of messages in
a user’s Twitter feed.172  It has modified its algorithms in an attempt to pri-
oritize the “highest quality and most relevant content,”173 and to deprioritize
tweets from “bad-faith actors.”174
4. Transparency and Disclosure Requirements re Political/Electioneering
Advertisements
Twitter has also implemented new policies regarding political advertise-
ments to prohibit foreign operatives from purchasing political ads and to
enhance transparency for such ads.175  In October 2017, Twitter announced
that it intended to implement a political campaigning policy to increase
transparency regarding all advertisements on its platform, including politi-
167 See Rob Price, Twitter Says It Doesn’t Plan to Launch a Button to Report Fake News, BUSI-
NESS INSIDER (June 30, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-not-planning-
launch-button-report-fake-news-washington-post-report-2017-6.
168 See Alex Murray, How to Report Fake News to Social Media, BBC (Nov. 22, 2016), https:/
/www.bbc.com/news/38053324.
169 See TWITTER, http://twitter.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
170 See Report Abusive Behavior, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-
and-security/report-abusive-behavior (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
171 See Using Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twit-
ter#blocking-and-muting (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
172 Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Setting the Record Straight on Shadow Banning, TWIT-
TER BLOG (July 26, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/
Setting-the-record-straight-on-shadow-banning.html.
173 See Colin Crowell, Our Approach to Bots and Misinformation, TWITTER BLOG (June 14,
2017), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2017/Our-Approach-
Bots-Misinformation.html.
174 Gadde & Beykpour, supra note 172.
175 See Vijaya Gadde & Bruce Falck, Increasing Transparency for Political Campaigning Ads
on Twitter, TWITTER BLOG (May 24, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/
company/2018/Increasing-Transparency-for-Political-Campaigning-Ads-on-Twitter.html.
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cal/electioneering ads and issue-based ads.176  Twitter implemented these
policies in June 2018.177  As part of its new political campaigning policy,178
Twitter requires all “advertisers who want to run political campaigning ads
for [U.S.] Federal elections to self-identify and certify that they are located in
the U.S.”179  Under this policy, Twitter prohibits foreign nationals from
targeting political ads “to people who are identified as being in the U.S.”180
As part of these recently implemented measures, Twitter also now includes a
“visual political ad indicator” (see Figure 3) for all “electioneering” ads—
those that refer to a clearly identified candidate (or party associated with that
candidate) for any elected office—and requires electioneering advertisers to
identify their campaigns.181
FIGURE 3
Twitter has also set up an “Ads Transparency Center” that includes, for
each electioneering ad, (1) “[d]isclosure on total campaign ad spend by
advertiser”; (2) “[t]ransparency about the identity of the organization fund-
ing the campaign”; (3) “[t]argeting demographics, such as age, gender and
geography”; and (4) “[h]istorical data about all electioneering ad spending
176 See id.
177 See Bruce Falck, Providing More Transparency Around Advertising on Twitter, TWITTER
BLOG (June 28, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/
Providing-More-Transparency-Around-Advertising-on-Twitter.html.
178 See Political Content, TWITTER BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-poli-
cies/restricted-content-policies/political-campaigning.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
179 See Gadde & Falck, supra note 175.
180 Id.
181 See Bruce Falck, New Transparency for Ads on Twitter, TWITTER BLOG (Oct. 24, 2017)
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/product/2017/New-Transparency-For-
Ads-on-Twitter.html.
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by advertiser.”182  In addition, Twitter revised its policies for electioneering
advertisers to (1) “[i]nclude stricter requirements on who can serve these ads
and to limit targeting options,” (2) “[r]equire electioneering advertisers to
self-identify as such,” and (3) provide “stronger penalties for advertisers who
violate these policies.”183  Indeed, Twitter’s recently implemented measures
limiting foreign entities from purchasing political ads and imposing disclo-
sure requirements on political ads go beyond those that are encompassed in
the proposed Honest Ads Act, discussed below, and manifest a commitment
from Twitter to meaningfully address the problems of foreign interference in
the U.S. political process.
5. Future Plans
Twitter’s CEO, Jack Dorsey, has also promised to develop and imple-
ment future plans to combat false news and create a healthier discourse,
including “rethinking core parts of Twitter to curb the spread of hate speech,
harassment and false news.”184  Dorsey has also indicated that Twitter intends
to experiment with the implementation of “features that would allow people
to see alternative viewpoints and reduce ‘echo chambers.’”185
6. Analysis of Twitter’s Efforts
Twitter’s efforts to combat false news on its platform have been less
extensive than Facebook’s comparable efforts, and have largely focused on
removing fake and suspicious accounts.  Recent empirical studies indicate
that Twitter’s efforts to combat false news have been less successful than the
efforts undertaken by Facebook.186  According to a recent analysis by Mat-
thew Hindman and Vlad Barash, as of October 2018, Twitter was still awash
with fake news, with more than eighty percent of the accounts that regularly
spread misinformation in 2016 still active.187  The report examined more
than seven hundred thousand Twitter accounts, which linked to more than
six hundred sites spreading misinformation or conspiracy stories, and found
that those accounts still publish over one million tweets per day.188  As dis-
182 Ads Transparency Center, TWITTER, https://ads.twitter.com/transparency (last visited
Mar. 15, 2019).
183 Flack, supra note 181.
184 Kristine Phillips, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey Admits ‘Left-Leaning’ Bias but Says It Doesn’t
Influence Company Policy, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2018/08/19/twitter-ceo-jack-dorsey-admits-left-leaning-bias-says-it-doesnt-influ-
ence-company-policy/?utm_term=.282e9bf8732b.
185 See id.; CNN, Twitter CEO: ‘We Are Not’ Discriminating Against Any Political Viewpoint,
YOUTUBE (Aug.19, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cm_lmWWKDug.
186 See Allcott et al., supra note 101, at 5 (observing that fake news interactions on
Facebook fell sharply following the 2016 U.S. presidential election—declining by more
than fifty percent—while Twitter shares continued to increase).
187 Jason Schwartz, Twitter Still Awash in Fake News, Study Finds, POLITICO (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/04/twitter-fake-news-866676.
188 Id.
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cussed above, unlike Facebook, Twitter has not implemented a mechanism
for users to flag false news or false accounts, nor has it worked with third-
party fact-checkers to evaluate the veracity of posts or to develop counter-
speech in response to posts determined to be false.  Twitter should adopt and
implement measures similar to those that Facebook has implemented that
have been shown to be most effective at combatting false news and that are
consistent with First Amendment values.
D. What the U.S. Legislature Seeks to Do: The Honest Ads Act
The proliferation of false statements, misleading information, and fake
accounts in the online marketplace of ideas—predominantly originated by
foreign sources—has had a profoundly harmful effect on our democratic
process, as discussed above.  Yet, social media platforms have been largely
immune from federal election campaign regulations and related regulations
that have long been applicable to other sources of news and information in
our political information ecosystem that mandate transparency and account-
ability requirements.189  Various federal statutes, Federal Election Commis-
sion rules,190 and Federal Communications Commission rules191 currently
impose transparency requirements on political advertisements disseminated
by broadcast, cable, and satellite providers, and also impose requirements on
these providers prohibiting foreign participation in U.S. elections; yet, online
platforms like Facebook and Twitter are currently not subject to analogous
regulations (although these platforms have recently committed to self-regula-
tion in this arena, as discussed above192).  This is despite the fact that
Facebook’s user base of 204 million American users is ten times larger than
the subscriber base of the largest cable and satellite providers193 and despite
the fact that over one billion dollars was spent on online advertising in
2016.194  This lack of regulation has allowed foreign actors to influence the
electorate, including by allowing Russian entities to purchase approximately
three thousand ads between June 2015 and May 2017 linked to fake accounts
189 See infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
190 See Fredreka Schouten, Federal Regulators Approve Narrow Facebook Ad Disclosure, USA
TODAY, (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/14/fed-
eral-regulators-weigh-whether-unmask-online-political-ad-buyers/951425001.
191 E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2012).
192 See supra Section III.B, III.C.
193 Compare Leading Countries Based on Number of Facebook Users as of July 2018 (in Mil-
lions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-
number-of-facebook-users (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (showing the amount of U.S.
Facebook users), with Pay TV Providers Ranked by the Number of Subscribers in the United States
as of September 2018 (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/251793/pay-
tv-providers-with-the-largest-number-of-subscribers-in-the-us/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2019)
(indicating that the top television provider in the United States has only twenty million
subscribers).
194 Digital Political Advertising Spending in the United States from 2008 to 2020 (in Million
U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/309592/online-political-ad-
spend-usa/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
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associated with the pro-Kremlin Internet Research Agency.195  The Honest
Ads Act, introduced in October 2017 by Senators Mark Warner (D-VA), Amy
Klobuchar (D-MN) and the late John McCain (R-AZ), seeks to remedy this
regulatory disparity.  The Act attempts to address some of the problems cre-
ated by foreign interference in U.S. elections in the online arena by imposing
transparency regulations on online political advertisements and by requiring
that online platforms enforce the longstanding ban on foreign participation
in U.S. elections.196  Although, as discussed above, social media platforms
like Facebook and Twitter are undertaking substantial measures themselves
to address such problems, government regulation in the form of the Honest
Ads Act is also an important tool to address these problems, and one wel-
comed by the platforms.197
The Honest Ads Act seeks to address problems in the online market-
place of ideas by extending three sets of requirements that have long been
imposed on communications platforms to online platforms: (1) the expan-
sion of disclosure requirements applicable to political advertisements; (2) the
expansion of public file requirements; and (3) the expansion of the obliga-
tion to undertake reasonable efforts to limit foreign interference in U.S.
elections.
First, the Honest Ads Act extends the disclosure obligations governing
political advertisements that print, broadcast, and cable advertisements must
meet to online platforms.198 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
requires that certain political ads in print, broadcast, and cable disclose who
has paid for the advertisement.199  This requirement currently does not
extend to paid internet or digital advertisements.  Under the Honest Ads Act,
the Federal Election Campaign Act’s definition of “electioneering communi-
cation” would be expanded to include online paid political advertise-
ments.200  Existing federal law also imposes disclosure requirements on
“public communications” that expressly advocate for a candidate’s election
or defeat, are paid for or authorized by a candidate, solicit a political contri-
bution, or are made by a political committee.201  The Honest Ads Act
195 See Schouten, supra note 190.
196 See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2017).
197 Both Facebook and Twitter have come out in support of the Honest Ads Act. See
Aimee Picchi, Facebook: What Is the Honest Ads Act?, CBS NEWS, (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www
.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-hearings-what-is-the-honest-ads-act; Twitter Public Policy
(@Policy), TWITTER (Apr. 10, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://twitter.com/Policy/status/
983734917015199744.
198 S. 1989, § 2 (“The purpose of this Act is to enhance the integrity of American
democracy and national security by improving disclosure requirements for online political
advertisements . . . .”).
199 52 U.S.C. § 30120 (2012).
200 S. 1989, § 6.
201 Advertising and Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/advertising/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2019); Public Communications, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/press/
resources-journalists/public-communications/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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updates the definition of “public communication” as well, to ensure that dis-
closure obligations applicable to these types of advertisements extend to the
online environment as well.202
Second, under the Honest Ads Act, large digital platforms (those with
more than fifty million unique monthly visitors) would be required to main-
tain publicly available records of political advertisements by a purchaser
whose aggregate requests to purchase political advertisements on that plat-
form exceed $500 within the past year.203  Such records must include a digi-
tal copy of the political advertisement, as well as a description of the target
audience, the ad rate, the name of the candidate or office that the ad was
supporting, and the contact information of the purchaser of the ad.204  Like
the Federal Communication Commission’s broadcast file rules, the Act would
apply to ads made by, for, or about political candidates, about elections, and
about “national legislative issue[s] of public importance.”205
Third, the Honest Ads Act would mandate that all advertising plat-
forms—including online platforms—make reasonable efforts to comply with
the foreign participation ban.206  This longstanding ban prohibits foreign
nationals from attempting to influence elections through donations, expend-
itures, or other things of value.207  Existing regulations applicable to broad-
cast, cable, and satellite platforms include a broad prohibition on the
involvement of foreign nationals with elections in the United States, under
which foreign nationals are prohibited from making any contribution, dona-
tion, or expenditure in connection with any federal, state, or local election;
making any contribution or donation to any committee or organization of
any national, state, or local political party; or making any disbursement for an
electioneering communication.  The Act would extend these prohibitions to
the online environment as well.
The Honest Ads Act’s extension of regulations regarding elections and
election-related advertisements to online platforms is an important step
toward fixing the flaws in the online marketplace of ideas and is consistent
with First Amendment law.  Since the early days of campaign finance regula-
tion the Supreme Court has upheld legislative efforts aimed at advancing
transparency and facilitating other conditions necessary for an informed
electorate, and the Honest Ads Act’s extension of requirements and obliga-
tions to online platforms to advance these goals is likely to be upheld against
First Amendment challenge.  Even the Supreme Court’s much maligned Citi-
zens United v. FEC decision—which struck down most of the statutory provi-
sions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)—upheld the Act’s
disclosure and public file requirements, which were aimed at informing the
202 S. 1989, § 5.
203 Id. § 8(a).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 See id. § 9.
207 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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electorate about the source of election-related advertisements.208  Among its
other challenges to BCRA, Citizens United brought a challenge to the
BCRA’s disclosure provisions as applied to its movie Hillary and to three tele-
vision advertisements for the movie.209  These ads fell within BCRA’s defini-
tion of “electioneering communication” because they referred to candidate
Hillary Clinton by name shortly before a primary election and contained
pejorative references to her candidacy.210  BCRA section 311 requires that
televised “electioneering communications” funded by anyone other than a
candidate must include a statement clearly indicating who is responsible for
the ad (in the form of “is responsible for the content of this advertising”),211
along with the name and address (or web address) of the person who funded
the ad.212  In addition, BCRA requires that anyone who spends more than
$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year file a
detailed statement with the FEC, providing his or her name, amount of
expenditure, and the name of the election to which the communication is
directed, among other details.213  Citizens United challenged the disclosure
and public file provisions of BCRA, arguing that they unconstitutionally bur-
dened its First Amendment rights.214  The Supreme Court rejected these
challenges and upheld these requirements.  The Court explained that these
provisions “‘provid[e] the electorate with information’ . . . and ‘insure that
the voters are fully informed’ about the person or group who is speaking’ . . .
‘so that people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being
subjected.’”215  The Court concluded that these requirements were a less
restrictive alternative compared to other, more extensive regulations of cam-
paign speech, that “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking
about a candidate shortly before an election,” and that this “informational
interest alone is sufficient to justify application of [the Act] to these ads.”216
In summary, the Honest Ads Act’s provisions—which extend existing dis-
closure and public file requirements to online platforms and require that
such platforms comply with the foreign participation ban—would substan-
tially address flaws in the online marketplace of ideas that were prevalent in
connection with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and thereafter, and
should be adopted by the legislature and upheld by the courts as consistent
with the First Amendment.
208 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368–71 (2010).
209 Id. at 319–21.
210 Id. at 322–23.
211 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(2).
212 Id. § 30120(a)(3).
213 Id. §§ 30104(f)(1)–(2).
214 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321 (2010).
215 Id. at 368 (citations omitted) (first quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196
(2003); then quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 (1976) (per curiam); and then quot-
ing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978)).
216 Id. at 369.
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E. What U.S. Litigants Are Doing: Defamation Actions Against
Purveyors of False News
Another significant way in which flaws in the online marketplace of ideas
are being addressed is through the vehicle of defamation lawsuits brought by
targets of false news against those who traffic in and profit from such content.
Prominent recent examples of defamation actions against false news purvey-
ors include those recently brought by the families of the Sandy Hook victims
against notorious InfoWars publisher Alex Jones.217  Jones’s InfoWars web-
site has published several articles and videos claiming that the December
2012 Sandy Hook massacre never actually happened and was instead an elab-
orate hoax invented by government-backed “gun grabbers” to limit Ameri-
cans’ Second Amendment rights.218  Jones maintained that the Sandy Hook
massacre was staged by the government using actors, and that the family
members of the Sandy Hook victims are actually “crisis actors” who are lying
about their children being killed.219  In reliance on the false claims, followers
of Jones have stalked and harassed the families of Sandy Hook victims to
demand “proof” that their loved ones were actually killed, and have commu-
nicated death threats to them, causing the victims to move to protect their
families.220  In three separate lawsuits, the families of Sandy Hook victims,
along with an FBI agent who was involved in responding to the massacre,
claim that Jones defamed them by accusing them of participating in such
fraudulent or illegal activities.  The plaintiffs in the lawsuits assert that such
claims have harmed their reputations and subjected them to public con-
217 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Original Petition & Request for Disclosure at 14–16, Heslin v.
Jones, No. D-1-GN-18-001835 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 2018); Sebastian Murdock, Sandy
Hook Parents Hit Alex Jones with Defamation Lawsuits, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 17, 2018, 5:46
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sandy-hook-parents-hit-alex-jones-with-defa-
mation-lawsuits_us_5acf6a6de4b0ac383d74bfe1.  Jones is also facing a defamation lawsuit
brought by Brennan Gilmore, the man who recorded the deadly car attack at Charlottes-
ville’s white supremacy rally in 2017 that killed Heather Heyer and injured nineteen other
people.  Rachel Weiner & Abby Ohlheiser, The Conspiracy Theorists Attacked Him. He’s Fight-
ing Back in Court., WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
public-safety/witness-sues-infowars-for-claiming-he-caused-charlottesville-protesters-death/
2018/03/13/4af0b4ee-26ca-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html?utm_term=.d0e4a2f561f6.
Jones falsely called Gilmore a “deep state shill” and a “CIA asset” and falsely accused him
of helping to organize the attack as a way of discrediting President Trump and his support-
ers.  Murdock, supra. As a result of these false claims, Gilmore has faced death threats,
doxxing, and harassment. See Brennan Gilmore, How I Became Fake News: I Witnessed a
Terrorist Attack in Charlottesville. Then the Conspiracy Theories Began., POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 21,
2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/21/fake-news-charlottesville-
215514.
218 Elizabeth Williamson, Truth in a Post-Truth Era: Sandy Hook Families Sue Alex Jones,
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tempt, disgrace, ridicule, and attack, and are seeking damages, including
punitive damages, upward of one million dollars.221
In ruling on such claims, courts are called upon to balance plaintiffs’
right to meaningful redress for damage to their reputation and dignitary
interests against the First Amendment mandate that debate on public issues
be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”222  One of the defamation lawsuits,
Pozner v. Jones, was brought by Leonard Pozner and Veronique De La Rosa,
whose six-year-old son, Noah, was among twenty students and six adults killed
at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, on December
14, 2012.223  In his motion to dismiss, Jones interposed the First Amendment
as well as the Texas Citizens Participation Act, which protects citizens’ free
speech rights against frivolous lawsuits.224  Jones also claimed that plaintiffs
are public figures (or at least limited-purpose public figures) because Pozner
has started a nonprofit to fight against “cruelty and criminality of abusive
activity” suffered by victims of tragedies, and De La Rosa has spoken publicly
in favor of an assault weapon ban.225  Because of these activities, Jones
claims, these plaintiffs should be subject to a heightened First Amendment
burden under the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence and should be
required to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his state-
ments were false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of his
statements.226  On August 30, 2018, the court denied Jones’s motion to dis-
miss, rejecting Jones’s argument that he was entitled to dismissal under the
Texas Citizens Participation Act and under the First Amendment.227
The defamation action against Jones will now proceed, requiring the
court (and jury) to consider whether Jones’s false characterizations of the
Sandy Hook massacre and the victims’ role in the aftermath constitute
221 Id.; see, e.g., Plaintiff’s Original Petition & Request for Disclosure at 14–17, Pozner v.
Jones, No. D-1-GN-18-001842 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 2018).
222 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
223 Plaintiff’s Original Petition & Request for Disclosure, supra note 221, at 2; William-
son, supra note 218.
224 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19–34, Pozner, No. D-1-GN-18-001842.  Under the
Texas Citizens Participation Act—Texas’s anti-SLAPP legislation—a defendant may move
to dismiss a lawsuit by establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the suit is “based
on, relates to, or is in response to [the defendant’s] exercise of the right of free speech,
right to petition, or right of association.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a)
(West 2017).  If the defendant meets his burden, the case must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff presents clear and specific evidence of each element of his or her claims, in which
case the burden shifts back to the defendant by proving each element of a valid defense.
225 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 224, at 6–14 (quoting HONR NETWORK,
https://www.honr.com/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2019)).
226 Id. at 45.
227 See Tom Kludt, Alex Jones’ Bid to Throw Out Sandy Hook Defamation Lawsuit Denied,
CNNMONEY (Aug. 31, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/30/media/alex-jones-
pozner-defamation-suit/index.html (reporting that the court denied Jones’s motion to dis-
miss in all respects); Jorge L. Ortiz, Alex Jones Denied in Request for Dismissal of Defamation
Lawsuit Against Him, USA TODAY, (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2018/08/30/alex-jones-request-dismissal-defamation-lawsuit-denied/1150498002.
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actionable defamation or protected speech.  Although all opinions and ideas
are protected by the First Amendment, false statements of fact that harm an
individual’s reputation are not.228  While the Supreme Court has—consistent
with the marketplace of ideas model—emphasized that there is no such
thing as a false idea, it has not extended similarly broad immunity to state-
ments that are capable of verification or falsification.229  Even if the court
determines in Pozner v. Jones and similar defamation suits that a heightened
burden of proof is applicable and requires defamation plaintiffs to establish
that Jones made such statements with knowledge of the statements’ falsity or
reckless disregard of whether the statements were false, plaintiffs should
nonetheless prevail on their defamation claims under this standard.  Jones
and other purveyors of harmful false news should not be able to wield the
First Amendment as a defense in cases like this one where he repeatedly
profits from false and damaging statements about plaintiffs.  In short, courts
should not prevent plaintiffs from wielding defamation law as a remedy to
help address the real harms and problems caused by false news in the online
marketplace of ideas.230
CONCLUSION
Today’s marketplace of ideas suffers from a host of serious problems
that Holmes could never have anticipated when he championed this model
one hundred years ago.  Fortunately, in adopting Holmes’s marketplace
model, the Supreme Court has done so in a manner that affords the govern-
ment sufficient—albeit limited—powers to intervene to remedy flaws in the
marketplace of ideas online.  Such government intervention is now necessary
228 E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
229 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact.”).
230 In addition, in order to wield defamation law to meaningfully fix the flaws in the
online marketplace of ideas, plaintiffs need to be able to know who is responsible for
defamatory content, and courts should not impose unduly burdensome obstacles on plain-
tiffs in their attempts to uncover the identity of those who anonymously defame them
online.  Since section 509 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 insulates web
forums from liability for defamatory content of their users, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012), and
since many defamatory statements are posted anonymously, in many cases it is difficult for
plaintiffs to identify the individual or individuals who are responsible for statements that
allegedly defame them.  Courts should not impose overly burdensome requirements on
defamation plaintiffs who are seeking to require web forums to disclose the identity of
those responsible for allegedly defamatory statements.  As one court explained, “[t]hose
who suffer damages as a result of tortious or other actionable communications on the
Internet should be able to seek appropriate redress by preventing the wrongdoers from
hiding behind an illusory shield of purported First Amendment rights.”  Cohen v. Google,
Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425, 429–30 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (quoting In re Subpoena Duces Tecum
to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 35 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d sub nom on other grounds, Am.
Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001)) (granting defa-
mation plaintiff’s petition to compel preaction disclosure requiring Google to turn over
information on the identity of an anonymous blogger who allegedly defamed plaintiff by
calling her a “skank,” “ho,” and accused her of “whoring”).
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to supplement the measures that leading online platforms like Facebook and
Twitter are undertaking in an attempt to address such problems.  The pro-
posed Honest Ads Act, which extends the obligation to limit foreign interven-
tion in U.S. elections and transparency and accountability obligations
regarding political advertisements to online platforms is one such effort that
is necessary to fix such flaws in a manner that is consistent with First Amend-
ment law.  In addition, online platforms should continue to implement mea-
sures to address flaws in the online marketplace of ideas in a manner that
advances First Amendment values—including by focusing on counterspeech
remedies instead of censorship remedies in response to harmful speech.
Finally, the common law of defamation should continue to be invoked by
injured parties to address flaws in the online marketplace of ideas, and courts
should not invoke the First Amendment to bar such efforts.  A combination
of new government regulation, use of existing common-law remedies, and
self-regulation by the online platforms themselves will enable us to make
meaningful progress toward fixing the flaws in the marketplace of ideas
online.
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APPENDIX A
Facebook Community Standards (Synopsis)
I. Violence and Criminal Behavior
1. Credible Violence
. . . .
Do not post:
The following threats:
• Credible statements of intent to commit violence against any person,
groups of people, or place (city or smaller).  We assess credibility
based upon the information available to us and generally consider
statements credible if the following are present:
° A target (person, group of people, or place) and
 Bounty/demand for payment, or
 Mention or image of specific weapon, or
 Sales offer or ask to purchase weapon, or
 Spelled-out address or named building, or





• Any statement of intent to commit violence against a vulnerable per-
son (identified by name, title, image, or other reference) or vulnera-
ble group, including (but not limited to) heads-of-state, witnesses
and confidential informants, activists, and journalists
Calls for violence or statements advocating violence against the following
targets (identified by name, title, image, or other reference)
• Any vulnerable person or group including (but not limited to) heads
of state, national elected officials, witnesses and confidential infor-
mants, activists, and journalists
• Public individuals, if credible as defined above
• Groups of people or unnamed specific person(s), if credible
• Places, if credible
• Where no target is specified but a symbol representing the target or
a visual of weapons is included
Aspirational and conditional statements of violence against
• Any vulnerable groups
• Public individuals, if credible (unless the individual is convicted of
certain crimes or is a member of a dangerous organization)
• Vulnerable person(s), if credible
• Groups of people or unnamed specific person(s), if credible
• Places, if credible
Any content created for the express purpose of outing an individual as a
member of a designated and recognizable at-risk group
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Instructions on how to make or use weapons if the goal is to injure or kill
people as may be evident from:
• As evident from language explicitly stating that goal, or
• As evident from imagery that shows or simulates the end result (seri-
ous injury or death) as part of the instruction
• Unless there is clear context that the content is for an alternative
purpose (for example, shared as part of recreational self-defense
activities, training by a country’s military, commercial video games,
or news coverage)
Instructions on how to make or use explosives, unless there is clear con-
text that the content is for a non-violent purpose (for example, clear sci-
entific/educational purpose use or fireworks)
Exposure of vulnerable individuals’ identities without their permission
Any content containing statements of intent, calls for action, representa-
tion, support or advocating for violence due to voting, voter registration,
or the outcome of an election
Misinformation that contributes to imminent violence or physical harm
2. Dangerous Individuals and Organizations
. . . .
We do not allow the following people (living or deceased) or groups to
maintain a presence (for example, have an account, Page, Group) on
our platform:
Terrorist organizations and terrorists
• A terrorist organization is defined as:
° Any non-governmental organization that engages in premeditated
acts of violence against persons or property to intimidate a civilian
population, government, or international organization in order to
achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim
• A member of a terrorist organization or any person who commits a
terrorist act is considered a terrorist
° A terrorist act is defined as a premeditated act of violence against
persons or property carried out by a non-government actor to
intimidate a civilian population, government, or international
organization in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideologi-
cal aim.
Hate organizations and their leaders and prominent members
• A hate organization is defined as:
° Any association of three or more people that is organized under a
name, sign, or symbol and that has an ideology, statements, or
physical actions that attack individuals based on characteristics,
including race, religious affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, gender,
sex, sexual orientation, serious disease or disability.
Mass and serial murderers
• We consider a homicide to be a mass murder if it results in four or
more deaths in one incident
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• We consider any individual who has committed two or more
murders over multiple incidents or locations a serial murderer
• We make these assessments based upon the information available to
us and will generally apply this policy to a mass or serial murderer
who meets any of the following criteria:
° They were convicted of mass or serial murder.
° They were killed by law enforcement during commission of the
mass or serial murder or during subsequent flight.
° They killed themselves at the scene or in the aftermath of the mass
or serial murder.
° They were identified by law enforcement with images from the
crime.
Human trafficking groups and their leaders
• Human trafficking groups are organizations responsible for any of
the following:
° Prostitution of others, forced/bonded labor, slavery, or the
removal of organs
° Recruiting, transporting, transferring, detaining, providing, har-
boring, or receiving a minor, or an adult against their will
Criminal organizations and their leaders and prominent members
• A criminal organization is defined as:
° Any association of three or more people that is united under a
name, color(s), hand gesture(s) or recognized indicia, that has
engaged in or threatens to engage in criminal activity, including






 Extortion or trafficking
 Assault
 Kidnapping
 Sexual exploitation (covered in section 7 and section 8)
We do not allow symbols that represent any of the above organizations or
individuals to be shared on our platform without context that condemns
or neutrally discusses the content.
We do not allow content that praises any of the above organizations or
individuals or any acts committed by them.
We do not allow coordination of support for any of the above organiza-
tions or individuals or any acts committed by them.
3. Promoting or Publicizing Crime
. . . .
Do not post:
Content depicting, admitting, or promoting the following criminal acts
committed by you or your associates
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• Acts of physical harm committed against people
• Acts of physical harm committed against animals except in cases of
hunting, fishing, religious sacrifice, or food preparation/processing
• Poaching or selling endangered species or their parts
• Staged animal vs. animal fights
• Theft
• Vandalism or property damage
• Fraud
• Trafficking as referenced in section 2
• Sexual violence or sexual exploitation, including sexual assault, as
referenced in section 7 and section 8
4. Coordinating Harm
. . . .
Do not post:
Statements of intent, calls to action, or advocating for the following:
• Acts of physical harm committed against people
• Acts of physical harm committed against animals except in cases of
hunting, fishing, religious sacrifice, or food preparation/processing
• Staged animal vs. animal fights
• Theft
• Vandalism/property damage
• Fraud, defined as the deliberate deception to take advantage of
another, secure an unfair gain, or deprive another of money, prop-




° Money Laundering (concealment of the origins of criminally
obtained money)
° Supporting and/or facilitating the misuse of payment cards
° Voter fraud, defined as any offers to buy or sell votes with cash or
gifts
• Voter suppression, defined as:
° Misrepresentation of the dates, locations, and times, and methods
for voting or voter registration
° Misrepresentation of who can vote, qualifications for voting,
whether a vote will be counted, and what information and/or
materials must be provided in order to vote.
° Other misrepresentations related to voting in an official election
may be subject to false news standards, as referenced in section 19
• Arranged marriages with refugees or internally displaced persons
• Trafficking as referenced in section 2
• Sexual violence or sexual exploitation, including sexual assault, as
referenced in section 7 and section 8
Offers of services to smuggle or assist in smuggling people.
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Content that depicts, promotes, advocates for or encourages participa-
tion in a high risk viral challenge, including content with no caption or
one that expresses a neutral sentiment.
5. Regulated Goods
. . . .
Do not post:
Content about non-medical drugs (other than alcohol or tobacco) that
• Coordinates or encourages others to sell non-medical drugs
• Depicts, admits to, or promotes sales of non-medical drugs by the
poster of the content or their associates
• Promotes, encourages, coordinates, or provides instructions for use
of non-medical drugs
• Admits, either in writing or verbally, to personal use of non-medical
drugs unless posted in a recovery context
Content that depicts the sale or attempt to purchase marijuana and phar-
maceutical drugs.  This includes content that
• Mentions or depicts marijuana or pharmaceutical drugs
• Makes an attempt to sell or trade, by which we mean any of the
following:
° Explicitly mentioning the product is for sale or trade or delivery
° Asking the audience to buy
° Listing the price
° Encouraging contact about the product either by explicitly asking
to be contacted or including any type of contact information
° Attempting to solicit the product, defined as:
 Stating interest in buying the product, or
 Asking if anyone has the product for sale/trade
• This applies to both individual pieces of content and Pages and
Groups primarily dedicated to the sale of marijuana or pharmaceuti-
cal drugs
Content that attempts to sell, gift, exchange, or transfer firearms, firearm
parts, ammunition, or explosives between private individuals.  This
includes content that
• Mentions or depicts firearms, firearm parts, ammunition, or explo-
sives and a product unrelated to firearms, and
• Makes an attempt to sell or transfer including any of the following,
unless posted by an entity representing a brick-and-mortar store,
legitimate website, or brand:
° Explicitly mentioning the product is for sale or trade or delivery
° Asking the audience to buy
° Listing the price or noting that the product is free
° Encouraging contact about the product either by
 Explicitly asking to be contacted
 Including any type of contact information
° Making an attempt to solicit the item for sale, defined as
 Stating that they are interested in buying the good, or
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 Asking if anyone else has the good for sale/trade
Content that attempts to sell, gift, exchange, transfer, promote or other-
wise provide access to instructions for 3D printing or computer-aided
manufacturing of firearms or firearm parts.
Content that depicts the trade (buying or selling) of human organs and/
or blood where trade is defined as:
• Mentioning or depicting the human organs and/or blood, and
• Indicating that human organs and/or blood are available for selling
or buying, or
• Listing a price or expressing willingness to discuss price
Content that encourages contact to facilitate the trade of human organs
and/or blood
Content that coordinates or supports the poaching or selling of endan-
gered species and their parts
. . . .
II. Safety
6. Suicide and Self-Injury
. . . .
Do not post:





Content that depicts graphic self-injury imagery
Except in limited situations of newsworthiness, it is against our poli-
cies to post content depicting a person who engaged in a suicide
attempt or death by suicide
. . . .
7. Child Nudity and Sexual Exploitation of Children
. . . .
Do not post:
Content that depicts participation in or advocates for the sexual
exploitation of children, including (but not limited to)
• Engaging in any sexual activity involving minors
• Adults soliciting minors
• Minors soliciting minors
• Minors soliciting adults
• Using our products and site functionality with the intention of
sexualizing minors
Content that constitutes or facilitates inappropriate interactions with
children, such as
• Initiating unsolicited contact with minors (for example, private
messages between stranger adults and minors)
• Soliciting, displaying, sharing, or viewing imagery of nude, sexu-
alized, or sexual activity with minors
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• Arranging real-world sexual encounters or obtaining sexual
material from a minor directly
• Displaying nudity to minors
Content (including photos, videos, real-world art, digital content,
and text) that depicts
• Any sexual activity involving minors
• Minors in a sexual fetish context
• Minors with sexual elements, including (but not limited to):
° Restraints
° Focus on genitals
° Presence of aroused adult
° Presence of sex toys
° Sexualized costume
° Stripping
° Staged environment (for example, on a bed) or professionally
shot (quality/focus/angles)
° Open-mouth kissing with minor or adult
Content (including photos, videos, real-world art, digital content,
and verbal depictions) that shows minors in a sexualized context
Content that depicts child nudity where nudity is defined as
• Visible genitalia (even when covered or obscured by transparent
clothing)
• Visible anus and/or fully nude close-up of buttocks
• Uncovered female nipples for children older than toddler-age
• No clothes present from neck to knee for children older than
toddler-age
• Digitally-created depictions of nude minors, unless the image is
for health or educational purposes
8. Sexual Exploitation of Adults
. . . .
Do not post:
In instances where content consists of any form of non-consensual
sexual touching, crushing, necrophilia or bestiality, including:
• Depictions (including real photos/videos), or
• Advocacy (including aspirational and conditional statements),
or
• Statements of intent, or
• Calls for action, or
• Participation by yourself or others to engage in any form of the
above mentioned sexual acts.
Content that attempts to exploit people by any of the following:
• Coercing money, favors, or images from people by threats of
exposure of their naked or semi-naked photos/videos
• Sharing imagery that fulfills all three of the following
conditions:
° Image is non-commercial or produced in a private setting
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° Person in the image is (near) nude, engaged in sexual activ-
ity, or in a sexual pose
° Lack of consent to share the image is indicated by
 Vengeful context (for example, caption, comments, or
page title)
 Independent sources (for example, media coverage or law
enforcement record)
 A visible match between the person depicted in the image
and the person who has reported the content to us
 The person who reported the content to us shares the same
name as the person depicted in the image
• Sharing imagery of people or a person focusing on sexualized
areas of the body such as the breasts, groin, or buttocks (also
known as creepshots or upskirts) or focusing on people
engaged in sexual activity.  The following elements need to be
present:
° the focal point is on a sexualized area of the body or sexual
activity, and
° the person in the image is clearly unaware
• Threatening or stating an intent to share intimate imagery with-
out consent
• Soliciting intimate imagery to view or share without consent
• Threatening or stating an intent to share private sexual
conversations
Attempting to coordinate adult commercial sexual services or prosti-
tution activities, such as requesting or offering or asking for rates for
escort services and paid sexual fetish or domination services.
. . . .
9. Bullying
. . . .
Do not post:
Content about another private individual that reflects
• Claims about sexual activity
• High-severity physical descriptions
• Ranking individuals on physical appearance or personality
• Threats of non-consensual sexual touching
• Sexualized text targeting another individual
• Attacks through derogatory terms related to sexual activity (e.g.
whore, slut)
• An individual in a context that is intended to degrade, for
example, menstruating, urinating, vomiting, or defecating
• Physical bullying where the context further degrades the
individual
• Comparison to animals that are culturally perceived as intellec-
tually or physically inferior or to an inanimate object
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Content that has been photoshopped to target and demean an indi-
vidual, including by highlighting specific physical characteristics or
threatening violence in text or with imagery
Content that specifies an individual as the target of
• Statements of intent to commit violence
• Calls for action of violence
• Statements advocating violence
• Aspirational and conditional statements of violence
• Physical bullying
• Claims about religious identity or blasphemy
In addition, we may remove Pages or Groups that are dedicated to
attacking individual(s) by, for example
• Cursing at an individual or individuals
• Making negative character claims
• Making negative ability claims
• Claims about blasphemy
• Appearing to be first person but is actually posted by a different
individual than the person referenced and targets more than
one individual
We also remove content that is targeted at minors when it contains:
• Cursing
• Claims about romantic involvement or sexual orientation
• Allegations about criminal or illegal behavior
• Coordinating, advocating, or promoting exclusion
• Negative character claims
• Negative ability claims
• Expressions of contempt or disgust
• Calls for death or serious disease or disability
• Videos of physical bullying or violence against minors in a fight
context shared with no caption or a neutral or praising caption
In some cases, content is written in the first person but is actually
posted by a different individual than the person referenced in the
content.  This may be done to target the person in the content with
the intention of degrading or shaming them.  We remove:
Content that contains the following and is reported by the individual
depicted:
• Claims about sexual activity
• Comparisons to animals that are culturally perceived as intellec-
tually or physically inferior or to an inanimate object
• High-severity physical descriptions
• Ranking individuals on physical appearance or personality
• Cursing at a person
• Claims about romantic involvement or sexual orientation
• Negative character or ability claims
. . . .
10. Harassment
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. . . .
Do not:
Repeatedly contact a single person despite that person’s clear
desire and action to prevent that contact
Repeatedly contact large numbers of people with no prior
solicitation
Send messages to any individual that contain
• Targeted cursing aimed at an individual or group of individu-
als in the thread
• Calls for death, serious disease or disability, or physical harm
aimed at an individual or group of individuals in the thread
• Bullying policy violations
• Claims that a victim of a violent tragedy is lying about being a
victim, acting/pretending to be a victim of a verified event, or
otherwise is paid or employed to mislead people about their
role in the event when sent directly to a survivor and/or imme-
diate family member of a survivor or victim
Send messages to a group that contain any bullying policy viola-
tions, regardless of whether the person being targeted is a public or
private individual
Target anyone maliciously, including public figures, by
• Attacking them based on their status as a victim of sexual
assault or sexual exploitation
• Threatening any participant in public discourse with violence
in an attempt to intimidate or silence them
• Calling for self-injury or suicide of a specific person, or group
of people
• Attacking them through derogatory terms related to sexual
activity (e.g. whore, slut)
Post content about a violent tragedy, or victims of violent tragedies
that include claims that a violent tragedy did not occur
Target victims or survivors of violent tragedies by name or by
image, with claims that they are
• Lying about being a victim of an event
• Acting/pretending to be a victim of an event
• Otherwise paid or employed to mislead people about their
role in the event
Target a minor who is a public figure with:
• Claims about sexual activity or sexually transmitted disease(s)
• Content has been photoshopped to include threats of violence
either in text or image (for example, adding bullseye, dart,
gun to head)
• Calls for death or serious disease or disability
• Statements of intent to commit violence or low severity harm
in an attempt to silence someone
• Objects created to attack through:
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° Targeted cursing
° High-severity physical description
° Claims about blasphemy
° Expressions of contempt
° Expressions of disgust
Post content about anyone, including a public figure, that contains
a name, photo, or video of the individual and:
• Any statements of intent to commit lethal violence, or
• Any calls for action of lethal violence, or
• Any statements advocating lethal violence
11. Privacy Violations and Impact Privacy Rights
. . . .
Do not post:
Content that facilitates identity theft by posting or soliciting per-
sonally identifiable information, including (but not limited to)
• National identification numbers, Social Security numbers,
passport numbers, or exam numbers
• Government IDs
• School and education IDs featuring two of the following: (1)
name, (2) photo, or (3) ID number
• Digital identities, including passwords
Content that contains medical/psychological, biometric, or genetic
records or official documentation of others
Content that facilitates identity theft by sharing personally identifi-
able information via an external link
Content that facilitates identity theft by sharing private financial
information of an organization or business
Content that facilitates identity theft by disclosing the following
personal financial information (of either the self or others)
• Bank account and/or card information
• Financial records paired with account information
Content that facilitates identity theft by sharing the private contact
information of others defined as
• Private phone numbers or addresses
• Email, Messenger, and chat identities
• The above information may be shared to promote charitable
causes, non-violating services, or to facilitate finding missing
people or animals
Except in limited cases of newsworthiness, content claimed or con-
firmed to come from a hacked source, regardless of whether the
affected person is a public figure or a private individual.
Content that identifies individuals by name and depicts their per-
sonal information, including:
• Driver’s licenses, Government IDs other than driver’s licenses,
Green Cards, or immigration papers
• Marriage, birth, and name change certificates
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• Digital identities, including passwords
• License plates
Content that includes photographs that display the external view of
private residences if the following conditions apply:
• The residence is a single-family home, or the resident’s unit
number is identified in the image/caption
• The city or neighborhood is identified
• A resident is mentioned or depicted
• That same resident objects to the exposure of their private
residence
Content that exposes the undercover status of law enforcement
personnel if
• The content contains the agent’s full name or other explicit
identification and explicitly mentions their undercover status,
or
• The content contains images identifying the faces of the law
enforcement personnel and explicitly mentions their under-
cover status
Content that exposes information about safe houses by sharing any
of the below, unless the safe house is actively promoting its loca-
tion, contact information, or the type of service and protection it
offers through comments, posts, Pages or Groups:
• Actual address of the safe house (post box only is allowed),
• Images of the safe house,
• Identifiable city/neighborhood of the safe house, or
• Information outing residents of the safe house
The following content also may be removed
• A reported photo or video of people where the person
depicted in the image is:
° A minor under thirteen years old, and the content was
reported by the minor or a parent or legal guardian,
° A minor between thirteen and eighteen years old, and the
content was reported by the minor,
° An adult, where the content was reported by the adult from
outside the United States and applicable law may provide
rights to removal
° Any person who is incapacitated and unable to report the
content on their own
III. Objectionable Content
12. Hate Speech
. . . .
Do not post:
Tier 1 attacks, which target a person or group of people who share
one of the above-listed characteristics or immigration status
(including all subsets except those described as having carried out
violent crimes or sexual offenses), where attack is defined as
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• Any violent speech or support in written or visual form
• Dehumanizing speech such as reference or comparison to:
° Insects
° Animals that are culturally perceived as intellectually or
physically inferior
° Filth, bacteria, disease and feces
° Sexual predator
° Subhumanity
° Violent and sexual criminals
° Other criminals (including but not limited to “thieves,”
“bank robbers,” or saying “all [protected characteristic or
quasi-protected characteristic] are ‘criminals’”)
• Mocking the concept, events or victims of hate crimes even if
no real person is depicted in an image
• Designated dehumanizing comparisons in both written and
visual form
Tier 2 attacks, which target a person or group of people who share
any of the above-listed characteristics, where attack is defined as
• Statements of inferiority or an image implying a person’s or a
group’s physical, mental, or moral deficiency
° Physical (including but not limited to “deformed,” “unde-
veloped,” “hideous,” “ugly”)
° Mental (including but not limited to “retarded,” “cretin,”
“low IQ,” “stupid,” “idiot”)
° Moral (including but not limited to “slutty,” “fraud,”
“cheap,” “free riders”)
• Expressions of contempt or their visual equivalent, including
(but not limited to)
° “I hate”
° “I don’t like”
° “X are the worst”
• Expressions of disgust or their visual equivalent, including




° Cursing at a person or group of people who share protected
characteristics
Tier 3 attacks, which are calls to exclude or segregate a person or
group of people based on the above-listed characteristics.  We do
allow criticism of immigration policies and arguments for restrict-
ing those policies.
Content that describes or negatively targets people with slurs,
where slurs are defined as words commonly used as insulting
labels for the above-listed characteristics.
13. Violence and Graphic Content
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. . . .
Do not post:
Imagery of violence committed against real people or animals with
comments or captions by the poster that contain
• Enjoyment of suffering
• Enjoyment of humiliation
• Erotic response to suffering
• Remarks that speak positively of the violence; or
• Remarks indicating the poster is sharing footage for sensa-
tional viewing pleasure
Videos of dying, wounded, or dead people if they contain
• Dismemberment unless in a medical setting
• Visible internal organs
• Charred or burning people unless in the context of cremation
or self-immolation when that action is a form of political
speech or newsworthy
• Victims of cannibalism
Videos that show child abuse, defined as
• Repeated kicking, beating, slapping, or stepping on by an
adult or animal
• Strangling or suffocating by an adult or animal
• Drowning by an adult or animal
• Biting through skin by an adult or animal
• Poisoning by an adult
• Forcible restraint by an adult
• Inflicting of burn or cut wounds by an adult
• Forcible smoking
• Tossing, rotating, or shaking of an infant (too young to stand)
by their wrists/ankles, arms/legs, or neck
. . . .
14. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity
. . . .
Do not post:
Images of
• Real nude adults, where nudity is defined as
° Visible genitalia except in the context of birth giving and
after-birth moments or health-related situations (for exam-
ple, gender confirmation surgery, genitalia self-examination
for cancer or disease prevention/assessment)
° Visible anus and/or fully nude close-ups of buttocks unless
photoshopped on a public figure
° Uncovered female nipples except in the context of
breastfeeding, birth giving and after-birth moments, health-
related situations (for example, post-mastectomy, breast
cancer awareness or gender confirmation surgery) or an act
of protest
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• Sexual activity, including
° Sexual intercourse
 Explicit sexual intercourse, defined as mouth or genitals
entering or in contact with another person’s genitals or
anus, where at least one person’s genitals are nude
 Implied sexual intercourse, defined as mouth or genitals
entering or in contact with another person’s genitals or
anus, even when the contact is not directly visible, except
in cases of a sexual health context, advertisements, and
recognized fictional images or with indicators of fiction
 Implied stimulation of genitalia/anus, defined as stimu-
lating genitalia/anus or inserting objects into genitalia/
anus, even when the activity is not directly visible, except
in cases of sexual health context, advertisements, and rec-
ognized fictional images or with indicators of fiction
° Other sexual activities including (but not limited to)
• Erections
• Presence of by-products of sexual activity
• Stimulating genitals or anus, even if above or under
clothing
• Use of sex toys, even if above or under clothing
• Stimulation of naked human nipples
• Squeezing naked female breast except in breastfeeding
context
° Fetish content that involves




• Feces, urine, spit, snot, menstruation, or vomit
Digital content that meets our definition of sexual activity unless
any of the following conditions exist
• Content where the sexual activity (intercourse or other sexual
activities) is not directly visible
• Content was posted in a satirical or humorous context
• Content was posted in an educational or scientific context
• Imagery is not sufficiently detailed and only body shapes or
contours are visible
15. Sexual Solicitation
. . . .
Do not post:
Attempted coordination of or recruit for adult sexual activities,
including but not limited to:
• Filmed sexual activities
• Pornographic activities, strip club shows, live sex perform-
ances, erotic dances
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• Sexual, erotic, or tantric massages
Explicit sexual solicitation by, including but not limited to the fol-
lowing, offering or asking for:
• Sex or sexual partners
• Sex chat or conversations
• Nude images
Implicit sexual solicitation, which we define as an offer or request
to engage paired with at least one of the following elements, none
of which violate our Community Standards on their own:
• Suggestive statements, such as “looking for a good time
tonight”
• Sexualized slang
• Sexual hints such as mentioning sexual roles, sex positions,
fetish scenarios, state of arousal, act of sexual intercourse or
activity (sexual penetration or self-pleasuring), commonly sex-
ualized areas of the body such as the breasts, groin, or but-
tocks, state of hygiene of genitalia or buttocks
• Content (hand drawn or real-world art) that may depict
explicit sexual activity or suggestively posed person(s).
An offer or ask for other adult activities such as:
• Commercial pornography
• Nude images, unless modeling context is clear
Sexually explicit language that goes into graphic detail beyond
mere reference to:
• A state of sexual arousal (wetness or erection)
• An act of sexual intercourse (sexual penetration, self-pleasur-
ing or exercising fetish scenarios)
16. Cruel and Insensitive
. . . .
Do not post:
Content that depicts real people and mocks their implied or
actual serious physical injuries, disease, or disability, non-consen-
sual sexual touching, or premature death
IV. Integrity and Authenticity
17. Spam
. . . .
Do not:
• Artificially increase distribution for financial gain
• Create or use fake accounts or compromise other people’s
accounts to
° Impersonate or pretend to be a business, organization, pub-
lic figure, or private individual
° Attempt to create connections, create content, or message
people
• Restrict access to content by requiring people to like, share, or
recommend before viewing
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• Encourage likes, shares, or clicks under false pretenses
• Maliciously use login credentials or personally identifiable
information by:
° Attempting to gather or share login credentials or person-
ally identifiable information
° Using another person’s login credentials or personally iden-
tifiable information
• Promise non-existent Facebook features
18. Misrepresentation
. . . .
Do not:
Misrepresent your identity by
• Using a name that does not abide by our name policies
• Providing a false date of birth
Misuse our profiles product by
• Creating a profile for someone under thirteen years old
• Maintaining multiple accounts
• Creating inauthentic profiles
• Sharing an account with any other person
• Creating another account after being banned from the site
• Evading the registration requirements outlined in our Terms
of Service
Impersonate others by
• Using their images with the explicit aim to deceive people
• Creating a profile assuming the persona of or speaking for
another person or entity
• Creating a Page assuming to be or speak for another person
or entity for whom the user is not authorized to do so.
• Posting imagery that is likely to deceive the public as to the
content’s origin, if:
° The entity or an authorized representative objects to the
content, and
° Can establish a risk of harm to members of the public.
Engage in inauthentic behavior, which includes creating, manag-
ing, or otherwise perpetuating
• Accounts that are fake
• Accounts that have fake names
• Accounts that participate in, or claim to engage in, coordi-
nated inauthentic behavior, meaning that multiple accounts
are working together to do any of the following:
° Mislead people about the origin of content
° Mislead people about the destination of links off our ser-
vices (for example, providing a display URL that does not
match the destination URL)
° Mislead people in an attempt to encourage shares, likes, or
clicks
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° Mislead people to conceal or enable the violation of other
policies under the Community Standards
19. False News
. . . .
20. Memorialization
. . . .
V. Respecting Intellectual Property
21. Intellectual Property
. . . Facebook’s Terms of Service do not allow people to post con-
tent that violates someone else’s intellectual property rights,
including copyright and trademark. . . .
VI. Content-Related Requests
22. User Requests
. . . .
23. Additional Protection of Minors
. . . .231
231 Community Standards, supra note 97.
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APPENDIX B
Twitter Rules (Synopsis)
Content Boundaries and Use of Twitter
Intellectual property
. . . .
Graphic violence and adult content
[Definitions:]
[1] [G]raphic violence [is] any form of gory media related to death, serious
injury, violence, or surgical procedures. . . . [2] [A]dult content [is] any
media that is pornographic and/or may be intended to cause sexual arousal.
Twitter allows some forms of graphic violence and/or adult content in
Tweets marked as containing sensitive media. . . . However, you may not use
such content in live video, your profile, or header images. . . . Additionally,
Twitter may sometimes require you to remove excessively graphic
violence. . . .
Media depicting deceased individuals: We may require you to remove media
that depicts the death of an identifiable individual if we receive a request
from their family or an authorized representative. . . .
Unlawful use
You may not use our service for any unlawful purposes or in furtherance of
illegal activities. . . .
Distribution of hacked materials
We do not permit the use of our services to directly distribute content
obtained through hacking that contains personally identifiable information,
may put people in imminent harm or danger, or contains trade secrets. . . .
Trends
At times, we may prevent certain content from trending.  This includes con-
tent that violates the Twitter Rules, as well as content that may attempt to
manipulate trends. . . .232
These include trends that:
• Contain profanity or adult/graphic references.
• Incite hate on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orienta-
tion, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or
disease.
• Violate the Twitter Rules.
In some cases, we may also consider the newsworthiness of the content, or if
it is in the public interest when evaluating potential violations.  In these cases,
the content might continue to trend on our platform.233
Third-party advertising in video content
232 The Twitter Rules, supra note 157.
233 Twitter Trend FAQs, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/
twitter-trending-faqs (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
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You may not submit, post, or display any video content on or through our
services that includes third-party advertising, such as pre-roll video ads or
sponsorship graphics, without our prior consent.
Misuse of Twitter badges
You may not use badges, including but not limited to the “promoted” or
“verified” Twitter badges, unless provided by Twitter. . . .
Misuse of usernames
Selling usernames: You may not buy or sell Twitter usernames.
Username squatting: You may not engage in username squatting. . . .
Abusive Behavior
. . . .
Context matters when evaluating for abusive behavior and determining
appropriate enforcement actions.  Factors we may take into consideration
include, but are not limited to whether:
• the behavior is targeted at an individual or group of people;
• the report has been filed by the target of the abuse or a bystander;
• the behavior is newsworthy and in the legitimate public interest.
Violence and physical harm
Violence: You may not[:]234
[1] [M]ake[ ] violent threats against an identifiable target.  Violent threats
are declarative statements of intent to inflict injuries that would result in seri-
ous and lasting bodily harm, where an individual could die or be significantly
injured, e.g., “I will kill you”.235
[2] [W]ish[ ], hope[ ], promote[ ], or express[ ] a desire for death, serious
and lasting bodily harm, or serious disease against an entire protected cate-
gory and/or individuals who may be members of that category.  This
includes, but is not limited to:
• Hoping that someone dies as a result of a serious disease, e.g., “I hope
you get cancer and die.”
• Wishing for someone to fall victim to a serious accident, e.g., “I wish that
you would get run over by a car next time you run your mouth.”
• Saying that a group of individuals deserve serious physical injury, e.g., “If
this group of protesters don’t shut up, they deserve to be shot.”236
[3] [T]arget[ ] individuals with content that references forms of violence or
violent events where a protected category was the primary target or victims,
where the intent is to harass.  This includes, but is not limited to sending
someone:
• media that depicts victims of the Holocaust;
• media that depicts lynchings.237
234 The Twitter Rules, supra note 157.
235 Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/hateful-conduct-policy (last visited, Mar. 13, 2019).
236 Id.
237 Id.
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[4] [A]ffiliate with organizations that—whether by their own statements or
activity both on and off the platform—use or promote violence against civil-
ians to further their causes.
Suicide or self-harm: You may not promote or encourage suicide or self-
harm. . . .
Child sexual exploitation: You may not promote child sexual exploitation. . . .
Abuse and hateful content
Abuse: You may not engage in the targeted harassment of someone, or incite
other people to do so. . . . [This includes] attempt[s] to harass, intimidate, or
silence someone else’s voice.
Unwanted sexual advances: You may not direct abuse at someone by sending
unwanted sexual content, objectify[ ] [someone] in a sexually explicit man-
ner, or otherwise engaging in sexual misconduct.
Hateful conduct: [1] You may not promote violence against, threaten, or
harass other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual
orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or
serious disease. . . .238
[2] [You may not] target[ ] individuals with content intended to incite fear
or spread fearful stereotypes about a protected category, including asserting
that members of a protected category are more likely to take part in danger-
ous or illegal activities, e.g., “all [religious group] are terrorists”.239
[3] [You may not] target[ ] individuals with repeated slurs, tropes or other
content that intends to dehumanize, degrade or reinforce negative or harm-
ful stereotypes about a protected category.  This includes targeted mis-
gendering or deadnaming of transgender individuals.240
Hateful imagery241 and display names: [1] You may not use hateful images or
symbols in your profile image, profile header.  [2] You may not . . . use your
username, display name, or profile bio to engage in abusive behavior, such as
targeted harassment or expressing hate towards a person, group, or pro-
tected category.242
238 The Twitter Rules, supra note 157.
239 Hateful Conduct Policy, supra note 235.
240 Id.
241 Twitter’s hateful conduct policy defines hateful imagery as
logos, symbols, or images whose purpose is to promote hostility and malice
against others based on their race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender
identity or ethnicity/national origin.  Some examples of hateful imagery include,
but are not limited to:
• symbols historically associated with hate groups, e.g., the Nazi swastika;
• images depicting others as less than human, or altered to include hateful
symbols, e.g., altering images of individuals to include animalistic features;
or
• images altered to include hateful symbols or references to a mass murder
that targeted a protected category, e.g., manipulating images of individuals
to include yellow Star of David badges, in reference to the Holocaust.
Hateful Conduct Policy, supra note 235.
242 The Twitter Rules, supra note 157.
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[3] [You may not] send[ ] an individual unsolicited hateful imagery . . . .243
Private information and intimate media
Private information: You may not publish or post other people’s private infor-
mation without their express authorization and permission. . . .
Intimate media: You may not post or share intimate photos or videos of
someone that were produced or distributed without their consent. . . . Note:
limited exceptions may apply . . . .
Threats to expose / hack: [1] You may not threaten to expose someone’s
private information or intimate media.  [2] You . . . may not threaten to hack
or break into someone’s digital information or attempt to incentivize others
to do so (e.g., through setting a bounty or reward on such actions).
Impersonation
[1] You may not impersonate individuals, groups, or organizations in a man-
ner that is intended to or does mislead, confuse, or deceive others. . . . [2]
[Y]ou may [not] maintain parody, fan, commentary, or newsfeed
accounts . . . if the intent of the account is to engage in spamming or abusive
behavior.244
243 Hateful Conduct Policy, supra note 235.
244 The Twitter Rules, supra note 157.
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